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Abstract
We consider a monopolist who sells identical objects of common but unknown value
in a herding-prone environment. Buyers make their purchasing decisions sequentially,
and rely on a private signal as well as previous buyers’ actions to infer the common
value of the object. The model applies to a variety of cases, such as the introduction of
a new product or the sale of licenses to use a patent. We characterize the monopolist’s
optimal pricing strategy and its implications for the temporal pattern of prices and for
herding. The analysis is performed under alternative assumptions about observability
of prices. We ﬁnd that when previous prices are observable, herding may but need not
arise. In contrast, herding arises immediately when previous prices are unobservable
and the seller’s equilibrium strategy is a pure Markov strategy. While the possibility
of social learning is present in the ﬁrst case, it is absent in the second. Finally, we
examine the seller’s incentive to manipulate the buyers’ evaluation of the object when
buyers are naive. Using secret discounts the seller successfully interferes with social
learning, and herding occurs in ﬁnite time.
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Markets for objects of common but unknown value are prone to herding when observable
purchasing decisions are made sequentially and buyers receive private signals about the
object’s value. To infer the common value of the object, buyers use the information from
previous buyers’ actions as well as their own private signal. As a result, buyers’ inferences
may give rise to informational cascades and herding, where the available public information
swamps the buyers’ private information and induces them to behave identically.1 We analyze
a monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy in such a market under alternative assumptions about
observability of prices.
The model applies to a variety of cases. One case is the sale of licenses to use a patent.
The patent owner is a monopolist who is selling a product that has uncertain value in the
early stages of its use, and hence buyers may try to infer the value of the license from
the sequence of previous purchases. Another case is the introduction of a signiﬁcantly new
product, such as computer software, new building materials, new medical equipment, or a
new type of vehicle. Frequently the value of a signiﬁcantly new product is uncertain to the
buyers for quite some time and the innovative ﬁrm enjoys a temporary monopoly.
For simplicity, we assume that the common value of the object sold by the monopolist is
either “high” or “low.” In each period the seller approaches a randomly chosen buyer, who
observes a private signal about the value of the object, and decides whether to buy one unit
of the object at the price demanded by the monopolist. We rely on the perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) as our equilibrium notion.2 For each buyer the optimal strategy is to buy
the object, if the price is less than the buyer’s expected value of the object. The buyers’
actions are publicly observed. After each buyer the monopolist decides which price to charge
the next buyer. Due to the particular nature of the buyers’ strategies, the PBE can be
derived directly from the seller’s optimal policy.
To demonstrate the monopolist’s optimization problem, consider the case where the price
demanded by the seller is publicly observed and buyers are rational. At any point in time
the seller must decide which price to charge the next potential buyer. Given the structure of
the model, the seller will ﬁnd it optimal to charge either a low price or a high price relative
to the current public evaluation of the object. If the monopolist demands the high price, a
prospective buyer will buy only if he has observed a signal that indicates high value, whereas
if she charges a low price, the buyer will buy independent of his signal. While a sale at the
1An informational cascade occurs when the (observable) actions reveal no information about private
signals. Herding occurs when agents behave identically, independently of their private signals. In our model
these two phenomena can only occur together.
2We use PBE to denote the singular, i.e., perfect Bayesian equilibrium, as well as the plural, i.e., perfect
Baysian equilibria.
1low price reveals no additional information about the object’s value, a sale at the high price
enables future buyers to infer the present buyer’s positive signal, and hence the monopolist
can demand even higher prices in the future. On the other hand, failure to sell at the high
price reveals that the respective buyer has received a signal that indicates low value, and the
monopolist is forced to charge lower prices in the future. Thus, demanding a high price is
like an investment with an uncertain outcome. We say that herding occurs when the seller
continues to charge the same price and buyers purchase the product independent of their
signals. In such a situation future buyers cannot infer anything from the earlier buyers’
behavior, i.e., there is an informational cascade and social learning stops. The aim of our
analysis is to characterize the monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy, and its implication for
the temporal pattern of prices and herding.
We show that the monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy is very sensitive to whether the
price demanded by the seller is publicly observed. If prices are publicly observed, herding
will occur with positive probability. However, a patient seller will trigger herding only if the
true state is known with high probability. Moreover, for certain parameter constellations
the seller triggers herding only when public information indicates that the expected value of
the object is high. This implies that while herding occurs when the expected value of the
object reaches a suﬃciently high level, this critical level may never be reached and in this
case herding will not occur. Interestingly, the seller continues to demand the high price as
the public evaluation of the object decreases, and the seller will not trigger herding in order
to prevent the buyers from learning that the true value of the object is low.
The monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy is quite diﬀerent when buyers don’t observe
the price at which previous purchasing decisions were made. We show that PBE in pure
strategies in which the seller’s strategy is Markov have the unique outcome that the low price
always is charged and hence herding arises immediately, provided the seller is patient or the
quality of the buyer’s signal is poor. Although previous prices are not observed these prices
are perfectly inferred in a pure strategy equilibrium. Since buyers’ beliefs are consistent with
the seller’s strategy, a purchase at the low price does not reveal any information. Thus, all
subsequent periods will be identical to the ﬁrst. Therefore, once it is uniquely optimal for
the seller to charge the low price, the seller’s optimal price continues to be the low price, and
buyers make no inferences from earlier sales. As a result, the seller would like to commit
to observable prices. The analysis reveals that a monopolist with the option of secretly
setting prices will be unable to manipulate the aggregation of information. This has large
implications for the possibility of social learning. While buyers may aggregate information
when prices are observable, this possibility is entirely absent when previous prices are not
observed.
Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998) suggest that in order to strategically mislead
2buyers, “a seller may be tempted to cut price secretly for early buyers, so that later buyers
will attribute the popularity of the product to high quality rather than low price (p.165).”
Our analysis shows that rational buyers cannot be deceived by secret discounts. Thus, such
an argument implicitly assumes that buyers are naïve in the sense that they do not expect
secret price cuts.
To analyze the seller’s incentive to manipulate learning we consider the case where the
monopolist posts a publicly observable price at each point in time, but may grant a buyer
an unobservable discount. In contrast to the previous two cases we relax the rationality
assumption and assume that buyers are naïve in the sense that they believe that previous
buyers paid the posted price. As suggested by Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998),
the seller may manipulate information aggregation when she can oﬀer secret discounts and
buyers are naïve. Speciﬁcally, the seller will post the high price and charge the low price
when the expected value of the object is suﬃciently low, causing naïve buyers to increase
their evaluation of the object. When the expected value of the object is suﬃciently large the
seller both posts and charges the low price. As a result, herding will occur in ﬁnite time,
provided the seller is patient or the quality of the buyer’s signal is poor. Surprisingly we ﬁnd
that generally it will not be optimal for the seller to always oﬀer secret discounts until she
triggers herding.
Related to the present paper is the literature on optimal experimentation, where buyers
learn from the experiments of earlier buyers. The objective of this literature is to determine
how the equilibrium level of experimentation compares to the eﬃcient level. See for example
Bergeman and Välimäki (2000) who determine the equilibrium in a model where an entering
ﬁrm oﬀers a good of uncertain value and engages in price competition with existing ﬁrms.
Buyers receive a publicly observable and noisy signal on the product’s quality, and sellers
account for this accumulation of information when choosing the optimal price. The primary
diﬀerence between the optimal experimentation literature and our analysis is that we assume
that buyers only observe previous purchasing decisions and not the actual signal. We can
therefore analyze a situation in which a monopolist optimally may choose to charge a price
such that herding occurs and learning stops. In the framework of the optimal experimentation
literature learning only stops if competitors choose to undercut the price of the incumbent.
Our analysis is therefore more closely related to that of the herding literature than to the
literature on optimal experimentation.
Since the pioneering articles of Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) a large
number of herding models has appeared.3 In contrast to our model the standard assumption
of this literature is that all buyers face the same price. Welch (1992), Avery and Zemsky
3References can be found, for example, in Devenow and Welch (1996), Gale (1996), Vives (1996), and
Bikhchandani et al. (1998). For a general analysis see Smith and Sørensen (2000).
3(1998), Neeman and Orosel (1999), and Ottavianni (1999) are four exceptions. The article
by Welch (1992) provides the ﬁrst rigorous discussion of strategic pricing in a herding-prone
environment. Whereas path-dependent pricing is at the center of our analysis, in Welch
(1992) it is considered only brieﬂy as a supplement to the main analysis, and in particular
with respect to a risk-averse issuer (p. 708-9). The reason is that Welch aims to explain
underpricing of initial public oﬀerings (IPO’s). Since the S.E.C. has banned variable-price
sales, the issuer can oﬀer shares to the public only at a ﬁx e dc o m m o np r i c e .C o n s e q u e n t l y
path-dependent pricing is not an interesting issue in the context of IPO’s.
Avery and Zemsky (1998) relax the ﬁxed-price assumption in a market where a posted
competitive price reﬂects the aggregated information. They show that a cascade cannot
occur in such an environment unless an additional dimension of uncertainty is introduced.
While in our model the monopolist can sell arbitrary many units of an object, Neeman
and Orosel (1999) consider the case where the monopolist is selling one single unit. Potential
buyers bid sequentially for this unit. Because of the winner’s curse they bid below the object’s
expected value conditional on public information, and the bids increase in value until herding
occurs. At this point the monopolist sells the object for the bid that has been reached. In
Neeman and Orosel the monopolist must decide whether to accept the current oﬀer. In our
model this is reversed: the buyer must decide whether to accept the monopolist’s oﬀer.
To the best of our knowledge, Ottaviani (1999) is the only paper that is closely related to
our work.4 Similar to our study, he considers monopoly pricing with social learning. While
the two papers are complementary in their objectives, they diﬀer in their methods. Further-
more, Ottaviani provides a thorough analysis only of the case where prices are observable,
and focuses his interest on welfare analysis and applications. In contrast, we analyze not only
the case of observable prices (with a more general treatment of cost), but we also examine
rigorously the case of unobservable prices and the case of secret discounts with naive buyers.
The paper proceeds as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 deals with
the case of observable prices, and Section 4 with the case of unobservable prices. In Section 5
we relax the assumption that buyers are rational and examine the case of secret discounts
and naïve buyers. Finally, we summarize the results and discuss extensions in Section 6.
Most of the proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2. The Model
We consider a risk-neutral monopolist who sequentially sells identical, indivisible objects to
a countably inﬁnite set of risk-neutral buyers. Each buyer buys at most one unit of the
4We are indebted to Christophe Chamley for making us aware of Ottaviani’s paper. At that time we had
already ﬁnished our own independent research on the subject.
4object. The object’s value is common to all buyers, and depends on the state of nature
ω ∈ Ω = {G,B}. In the “good” state ω = G the value, ˆ v(G), is “high,” whereas in the
“bad” state ω = B the value, ˆ v(B), is “low,” i.e., ˆ v(B) < ˆ v(G). Without loss of generality
we can choose the monetary unit such that ˆ v(G)−ˆ v(B)=1. The state of nature is unknown
to the seller and the buyers, however it is common knowledge among the seller and the
buyers that the a priori probability of the good state G is λ1 ∈ (0,1). We assume that the
seller has a constant marginal cost c ≥ 0. The seller has to incur this cost whenever she
sells a unit of the object, but if her oﬀer to sell the object is rejected, the cost c does not
accrue. This can be interpreted, for example, as production to order. Time is measured in
discrete periods t = 1,2,.... In each period the seller approaches a randomly chosen buyer
that she has not previously approached. The buyer observes a private signal about the
state of nature, and decides whether to buy one unit of the object at the price demanded
by the monopolist. We refer to the potential buyer in period t as buyer t and denote his
random signal by St ∈ S with realization st, where S = {g,b} denotes the signal space.
A signal realization g indicates the good state G a n di sc a l l e dt h e“ g o o ds i g n a l , ”a n da
realization b indicates the bad state B and is called the “bad signal.” Conditional on the
true state ω, buyers’ signals are independent and identically distributed for all buyers, and
they are imperfectly informative. The signals are correct with probability α ∈ (1
2,1), and
incorrect with probability 1 − α. That is, Pr[st = g | ω = G]=P r [ st = b| ω = B]=α and
Pr[st = g | ω = B]=P r [ st = b| ω = G]=1 − α.
In each period t ∈ {1,2,...} the seller demands a price ˆ pt from buyer t. For the analysis
it is useful to transform the variables ˆ v(ω), ω ∈ {G,B},a n dˆ pt,t∈ {1,2,...}, by subtracting
ˆ v(B). Therefore, we deﬁne v(ω) ≡ ˆ v(ω)−ˆ v(B), ω ∈ {G,B},a n dpt ≡ ˆ pt−ˆ v(B),t∈ {1,2,...}.
For simplicity we will call these transformed variables the value of the object and its price,
respectively. Whenever it matters, it will be clear from the context whether we refer to the
transformed or to the untransformed variables. Due to the normalization ˆ v(G) − ˆ v(B)=1,
the transformation gives v(B)=0and v(G)=1. Moreover, since it is common knowledge
that the seller can always sell at some price above the object’s minimum value and will never
be able to sell at a price at or above the objects maximum value, only prices pt ∈ (0,1) need
be considered.
For each buyer the action space is A = {0,1}. T h ea c t i o no fb u y e rt is denoted by at,
where at = 1 m e a n st h a th eb u y so n eu n i to ft h eo b j e c t ,a n dat =0that he does not buy the
object. Each buyer t observes the actions of all the previous buyers aτ,τ ∈ {1,...,t − 1}. The
payoﬀ for any buyer t from purchasing the object at a price ˆ pt is ˆ v(ω)− ˆ pt = v(ω)− pt, and
it is zero if the buyer refrains from buying the object. Each buyer t updates the probability
that the true state is the good state according to the actions of previous buyers, the prices
he observes or believes that previous buyers have been charged, and his own private signal.
5The buyer buys the object if and only if the expected payoﬀ from doing so is non-negative;
that is, if and only if the price does not exceed the expected value of the object conditional
on his updated beliefs.5
The seller discounts future revenues according to a discount factor δ ∈ [0,1). Her payoﬀ is
the discounted sum of her proﬁts,
P∞
t=1 δ
t−1 (ˆ pt − c)at =
P∞
t=1 δ
t−1 [pt +ˆ v(B) − c]at.Ap a r -
ticular case is the one where c equals ˆ v(B). In this case,
P∞
t=1 δ




a n dt h u st h es e l l e r ’ sp a y o ﬀ is determined by the transformed prices and the buyers’ actions,
independent of the cost c and the objects minimum value ˆ v(B), provided they are equal. In
each period t ∈ {2,3,...}, the seller knows the prices pτ she has demanded from previous
buyers, and the previous buyers’ actions aτ, τ ∈ {1,...,t − 1}.T h efull history of demanded
prices and buyers’ actions at time t ∈ {1,2,...} is denoted by Ht =( p1,a 1,...,pt,a t). The
history H0 is given by the empty set. The set of all possible full histories is denoted by H.
A pure strategy for the seller is a function P : H → (0,1) that maps every full history Ht−1
into a price pt,t∈ {1,2,...}.
The model constitutes a game between the seller and the buyers. For this game herding
is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition. Herding occurs at time T, if for all t ≥ T the seller charges a constant price
pt = pT and all buyers t ≥ T purchase the object regardless of their signal realizations.
Herding implies an informational cascade: no signals can be inferred from the actions
at,t ∈ {T,T + 1,...}. The alternative conceivable herding situation, where the price is
constant and all buyers refuse to buy regardless of their signal realizations, is not in the
seller’s interest and thus cannot occur in equilibrium.6
Although the model constitutes a game, this game is relatively simple and the PBE can
be derived almost directly from the seller’s optimal strategy. The seller can easily anticipate
how the buyers react to her dynamic pricing strategy, and she maximizes her expected payoﬀ
accordingly. In particular, the seller observes the full history and knows what buyers can
observe and what their beliefs about her own strategy are. Corresponding to the two signal
realizations st = b and st = g, the seller considers two types of buyer t, say type b and type
g, respectively. If she ﬁnds it optimal to charge a high price pt such that only type g buys
the good, then buyer t’s signal st is revealed to be high if he buys, and low if he declines to
buy the object. If the seller ﬁnds it optimal to charge a low price pt such that type b buys
the good, then type g will buy as well. In the case where prices are observable and buyers
are rational, charging the low price renders a purchase in period t uninformative. Therefore,
the situation facing the seller and buyer t+1 is identical to the one that the seller and buyer
5For technical reasons we assume the tie-breaking rule that a buyer purchases the good when he is
indiﬀerent.
6When c>ˆ v(B) the seller has the option of exiting the market.
6t were confronted with in period t, and the previous low price pt is also optimal in period
t + 1. Hence both types of buyers will purchase the good in period t + 1 and the argument
can be repeated for all the following periods. For observable prices this shows that herding
a r i s e s ,i fi na n yp e r i o dt the seller ﬁnds it optimal to charge a price pt such that buyer t
buys the good regardless of his type. Consequently, along the equilibrium path the posted
prices separate the two types of buyers until herding occurs, and agents can correctly infer
the private signals until herding arises.
We use the letter λ to denote the seller’s updated probability of the good state. Specif-
ically, let λt ≡ Pr(ω = G| λ1;Ht−1) denote the seller’s probability of the good state condi-
tional on the full history Ht−1. Whenever the seller charges the high price she can perfectly
infer all the buyers’ signals. Therefore, any λt must be an element of a countable set of λ’s
that is deﬁned as follows. For any prior λ1 ∈ (0,1) we deﬁne the set of λ’s that can be






there exists an integer T and a sequence of signal realizations
(s1,...,sT) ∈ {g,b}





Furthermore, for any given λ




ω = G| λ





ω = G| λ
l,ksignals s = b
¢
,w h e r es ∈
{g,b} denotes the signal realization. For simplicity we let λ
+ ≡ Pr(ω = G| λ,s = g) and
λ
− ≡ Pr(ω = G| λ,s = b). Thus, a buyer who learns λ and receives a good signal (type
g) assigns the updated probability λ
+ to the good state. Similarly, a buyer who learns λ
and receives a bad signal (type b) assigns the updated probability λ
− to the true state being
good.
As noted above there are two types of buyer t, corresponding to the two signal realizations
st = g and st = b. The seller’s associated conditional probabilities of the buyer’s type are
determined by λt and given by Pr(st = g | Ht−1)=λtα +( 1 − λt)(1 − α) ≡ ϕ(λt) and
Pr(st = b| Ht−1)=λt (1 − α)+(1 − λt)α = 1−ϕ(λt), respectively. Denote the probability
of the good state that buyer t infers from the history that he observes or perceives by µt,
where µt ∈ Λ(λ1). This probability does not include the information that buyer t derives
from his signal. It is buyer t’s probability of the good state “before” he observes his private
signal. When prices are observable, the seller’s and the buyers’ inference from the history
coincide, that is, µt = λt for all t. If prices are unobservable, this holds along any pure strategy
equilibrium path (because each buyer can deduce all previous prices from the seller’s pure
strategy), but not if the seller deviates. When the seller may mislead buyers by oﬀering
secret discounts, buyers’ beliefs evolve as if posted prices were actual prices and thus the
seller can always infer the (possibly mistaken) inference of each buyer from the perceived
7history.
We can simplify the analysis signiﬁcantly, if we ﬁrst assume that the marginal cost c
equals the minimum value ˆ v(B) of the object. At the end of the paper we discuss separately
the cases c<ˆ v(B) and c>ˆ v(B). If c =ˆ v(B), the game can be analyzed in terms of the
transformed variables v(ω), ω ∈ {G,B},a n dpt,t∈ {1,2,...}, without any reference to the
parameters c and ˆ v(B), which can both be ignored. The assumption c =ˆ v(B) is not only
analytically convenient, for some cases it is also quite plausible. For example, in the case of
a license for a patent the seller has no marginal cost and the patent may be without value
in the bad state, i.e., c =ˆ v(B)=0 .
3. Observable Prices
In this section we characterize the PBE in the case where the demanded price is publicly
observed. That is, each buyer t ∈ {1,2,...} is informed of the full history Ht−1,a n dt h e
seller and buyer t draw the same inference λt, which is common knowledge.
Buyer t’s strategy is simple: buy if and only if the seller demands a price pt ≤ E [v(ω)| λt,s t]
=P r ( ω = G| λt,s t). Consequently, at every λt the seller need only consider two possible
prices: she either charges a high price such that only type g buys the object, or she charges














λt(1 − α)+( 1 − λt)α
which we will call the “high price” and the “low price,” respectively. It is important to keep
in mind that these prices are both functions of λt ∈ [0,1] and not constants.
Given λt, no other prices can be optimal for the seller. The reason is that no sale will
occur at a price p>p H(λt), and the seller unnecessarily looses rent by charging a price
p such that pH(λt) >p>p L(λt),o rp<p L(λt). Given buyers’ strategies it is clear that
whenever either pH(λt) or pL(λt) is uniquely optimal, λt determines the seller’s optimal price
pt in period t. If pH(λt) and pL(λt) are both optimal for some λt ∈ Λ(λ1), the seller may
condition the price pt on aspects of the history Ht−1 that are not reﬂected in λt. However,
in all three cases the seller’s maximum expected payoﬀ from period t o n w a r d si su n i q u e l y
determined by λt. For any t ∈ {1,2,...} and λt ∈ Λ(λ1), we denote this payoﬀ by V (λt).
That is, V : Λ(λ1) → R is the seller’s value function in the case where all buyers t ∈ {1,2,...}
learn the seller’s information λt.
8If buyer t is charged the low price, then he will purchase the object regardless of his
signal and consequently λt+1 = λt. For the seller this implies that when pL(λt) is optimal at





As argued above, this shows that whenever the low price pL(λt) is uniquely optimal for some
λt, herding is triggered or continued in period t.7 On the other hand if the high price pH(λt)
is uniquely optimal, then the seller’s expected payoﬀ exceeds the one she would get if she





The stochastic process of the updated probabilities {λt}
∞
t=1 is a martingale. If the seller
charges the low price pL(λt) at some t, E (λt+1 | λt)=λt because no information is revealed.
If the seller demands the high price pH(λt), buyer t’s signal realization st will be revealed by
his action and therefore
E (λt+1 | λt)=ϕ(λt)λ
+
t +[ 1 − ϕ(λt)]λ
−
t = λt.
It can be shown that in contrast to the stochastic process of the updated probabilities
{λt}
∞
t=1 , the stochastic process of the seller’s optimal price is a martingale only after the
seller has triggered herding.
For the analysis of the seller’s optimal decision it is useful to distinguish between her
expected immediate return and her expected future return. First we examine the seller’s
expected immediate return, that is, her expected return in period t. The seller’s immediate













λt(1−α)+(1−λt)α for pt = pL(λt)
pH (λt)Pr(st = g | λt)=αλt for pt = pH (λt)
since pH (λt)=λ
+
t and Pr(st = g | λt)=λtα +( 1 − λt)(1 − α). The diﬀerence between the
expected immediate return from the two prices is
αλt − p
L(λt)=
λt [α2(1 − λt) − (1 − α)(1 − αλt)]
1 − ϕ(λt)
where ϕ(λt) ≡ Pr(st = g| λt) < α < 1.
7In the event that buyer t does not purchase the object at the low price pL(λt) the belief about his type
(i.e., about his signal st) by the seller and later buyers is irrelevant for the equilibrium outcome.




λ α is a strictly convex function
with pL(0) = 0 and pL(1)=1, whereas αλ, the expected immediate return from the high
price, is a linear function of λ ∈ [0,1] with αλ =0for λ =0and αλ = α < 1 for λ = 1.
Thus, either αλ <p L(λ) for all λ > 0 or the two curves have a unique intersection for λ > 0.













(a) "8 < pL(8) (b) "8 $ pL(8)
Figure 1: Immediate expected return from the high and low price, respectively.
If α2 ≤ (1 − α),t h et e r mα2(1 − λt) − (1 − α)(1 − αλt) ≤− (1 − α)2λt < 0 and thus
αλt − pL(λt) < 0 for all λt ∈ (0,1).W h e nα2 > (1 − α),
α




α2 − (1 − α) > 0 for λ =0
−(1 − α)2 < 0 for λ = 1
Note that the term α2(1−λ)−(1−α)(1−αλ) is continuous in λ ∈ [0,1], and because α > 1
2
it decreases in λ.H e n c ef o rα2 > (1 − α) there is a unique ¯ λα ∈ (0,1) such that
α
2(1 − ¯ λα) − (1 − α)(1 − α¯ λα)=0 . (3.1)






> 0 for λt < ¯ λα
=0 for λt = ¯ λα
< 0 for λt > ¯ λα
for some ¯ λα ∈ (0,1). This proves the following lemma.
10Lemma 1. If α2 ≤ (1 − α), t h ei m m e d i a t er e t u r nf r o mt h el o wp r i c epL(λt) is larger than
the expected immediate return from the high price pH(λt) for all λt ∈ Λ(λ1). If α2 > (1−α),
there exists a ¯ λα ∈ (0,1) such that the expected immediate return from the high price pH(λt)
is identical to the immediate return from the low price pL(λt) for λt = ¯ λα, whereas it is
larger for λt < ¯ λα and smaller for λt > ¯ λα.
Next we examine the seller’s expected future return, which is the sum of the expected
discounted returns from the next period onwards. The expected future return to the seller
is the sum of the expected discounted returns from the next period onwards. Thus, if the
seller charges the low price pL(λt) in t and triggers herding, then in period t her discounted
future return is δ
pL(λt)
1−δ .T h ef a c tt h a tpL(λ) is strictly convex for λ ∈ [0,1] implies that the
expected future return from charging the high price always exceeds that of the low price.
Lemma 2. For all λt ∈ Λ(λ1) the expected future return to the seller from charging the high
price pH (λt) in period t strictly exceeds that from charging the low price pL (λt) in period t.




λ α, where λ ∈ [0,1], is strictly convex; and V (λt) ≥
1



























because λt = ϕ(λt)λ
+
t +[ 1 − ϕ(λt)]λ
−
t and pL(λ) is strictly convex.
Combining the expected immediate and future return, Lemma 1 and 2 imply that when
α2 > (1 − α) and λt ≤ ¯ λα the seller always charges the high price pH (λt), since that price
maximizes both the immediate and the future return. Thus, for α2 > (1 − α) herding will
never arise at low λt’s. Surprisingly, the seller will not trigger herding in order to prevent
buyers from asymptotically learning that the bad state is the true state.8 For α2 ≤ (1 − α)
demanding the high price is a risky investment as the seller sacriﬁces some immediate return
for a higher expected future return. A suﬃciently patient seller will undertake such an
investment, but an impatient seller will trigger herding.
Although it is possible that buyers learn that the true state is bad with an arbitrarily
large probability, the converse is not true. The following lemma shows that the seller triggers
herding when buyers believe that the true state is good with a suﬃciently large probability.
That is, given λ1 the probability λt is bounded away from 1 along the equilibrium path.
8This conclusion is due to the result that α2 > (1 − α) implies ϕ(λt)pH(λt) >p L(λt) for all λt ∈ (0,¯ λα)
and is not driven by the fact that ϕ(λ)pH(λ)=pL(λ)=0for λ =0 .
11Lemma 3. Whenever the seller’s updated probability of the good state, λt, is suﬃciently
high, the seller charges the low price. That is, for every discount factor δ ∈ (0,1) there
exists an ²δ > 0 such that pt = pL(λt) whenever λt ∈ (1 − ²δ,1).
Proof: The seller’s payoﬀ from charging pL (λt) in period t equals
pL(λt)
1−δ . Since the seller’s
price always is less than 1, her expected payoﬀ from charging the high price pH (λt) is less
than αλt + δ
1−δ. The diﬀerence, pL (λt)−αλt +δ
pL(λt)−1
1−δ , converges to 1−α > 0 for λt → 1.
Thus, pL (λt) generates a higher expected payoﬀ than pH (λt) whenever λt is suﬃciently
large.
L e m m a3i si n t u i t i v e .I fλt is already high, the potential increase in the seller’s expected
future return from an increase of λt even to its upper limit of 1 is small. On the other hand,
if λt is high, the expected immediate return from the high price, αλt,i ss i g n i ﬁcantly smaller
than the immediate return from the low price, pL (λt), because pL (λt) is almost identical
to λt for high λt. Therefore, when the probability of the good state is suﬃciently high the
seller prefers to trigger herding rather than to aim at a further increase of this probability.
Not surprisingly the point at which herding is triggered is sensitive to the seller’s degree
of patience. In fact, given any ﬁxed probability λt ∈ (0,1) as u ﬃciently patient seller will
charge the high price pH (λt) at that λt (see Lemma 4, Appendix A.1).
The quality of the buyers’ signal, α, is critical for the seller’s optimal strategy. For
example, if α is close to 1, that is, if the signal is almost perfect, even an extremely impatient
seller will demand the high price unless λt is close to 1. This follows directly from Lemma 1,
Lemma 2, and the fact that ¯ λα → 1 for α → 1. The signiﬁcance of signal quality α for
the seller’s optimal strategy (and thus for the PBE) has the consequence that we need to
distinguish three cases that diﬀer with respect to the quality of the signal. These are the
















.W es a yt h a tt h es i g n a l
is “strong” in case (i) and “weak” in case (iii). Case (ii) we call the borderline case. In the
borderline case the likelihood ratio 1−α
α equals the probability α that the signal is correct.9
3.1. The Seller’s Optimal Strategy When the Signal is Strong
In the case of strong signals the seller’s optimal price has the following characteristics.
Proposition 1. Assume that prices are observable. If α2 > 1 − α, there exists a critical
9Note that the likelihood ratio 1−α
α determines the function pL(λt), which gives the immediate return
associated with charging the low price as a function of λt. The probability α determines the expected






dλt = α. Incidently, α2 =1−α is the equation for the “golden section.”





pH (λt) whenever λt <µ ∗
pL (λt) whenever λt >µ ∗
For λt = µ∗, pL (λt) is optimal, but pH (λt) may be optimal as well. Moreover, µ∗ > ¯ λα for
δ > 0,µ ∗ =m i n λ∈Λ(λ1)∩[¯ λα,1] λ for δ =0 , and µ∗ → 1 for δ → 1.10
Proof: Appendix A.1.
Proposition 1 shows that the set of attainable λ’s can be partitioned such that for low
λ’s the high price is optimal and for high λ’s the low price is optimal. The intuition is that
at high λ’s there is little to gain and much to lose from demanding the high price (Lemma
3). At low λ’s the converse holds: there is little to lose and much to gain from demanding
the high price. The reason is that when there is a large probability that there will be no sale
at the high price, the (high) price and thus the loss from not selling is small.
If the prior λ1 is suﬃciently large, the seller triggers herding immediately. Otherwise she
demands the high price pH (λ1) in period 1.B u y e r 1 buys if and only if he has received
the good signal. His action is publicly observed, and the seller and future buyers update
their beliefs accordingly. If buyer 1 bought the object (which reveals s1 = g)a n dλ
+
1 = µ∗,





= λ1 < λ
+
1 = pH (λ1)=p1 and trigger herding in
period 2.11 If buyer 1 bought the object but λ
+












period 2. In this way the process continues. Unless the seller triggers herding in t =2 , she
charges pH (λt) in each period t = {3,4,...,T} until, if ever, λt hits µ∗ at some t = T.A t
this point she lowers the price from pH (λT−1)=λ
+
T−1 to pL (λT)=λ
−
T = λT−1 < λ
+
T−1 and
triggers herding. However, λt may never hit µ∗ and consequently herding may never arise. If
herding does not occur, λt will converge to zero due to the martingale convergence theorem.
That is, it will asymptotically be revealed that the bad state is the true state.
3.2. The Seller’s Optimal Strategy in the Borderline Case
In the borderline case the seller’s patience, as measured by her discount factor δ, determines
the pattern of her optimal pricing strategy. An impatient seller triggers herding immediately,
whereas a patient seller follows a strategy that is analogous to the optimal strategy in the
case of strong signals. With a patient seller herding may but need not arise. Speciﬁcally,
the following proposition holds.
10In general only pL (µ∗) will be optimal at λt = µ∗ because Λ(λ1) is a discrete set.
11This assumes that in the improbable case that pL (µ∗) and pH (µ∗) are both optimal, the seller chooses
pL(µ∗). The intuitive explanations below are also based on this simplifying asumption.
13Proposition 2. Assume that prices are observable. If α2 = 1 − α, there exists a discount
factor δ
∗ ∈ [0,1) such that for all δ ∈ [0,δ
∗] the uniquely optimal prices are given by
pt = pL (λ1) for all t ∈ {1,2,...}. For each δ ∈ (δ
∗,1) there exists a critical probability





pH (λt) whenever λt <µ ∗
pL (λt) whenever λt >µ ∗
For λt = µ∗, pL(λt) is optimal, but pH (λt) may be optimal as well. Finally, µ∗ → 0 for
δ → δ
∗, and µ∗ → 1 for δ → 1.
Proof: Appendix A.1.
In contrast to the case of strong signals, in the borderline case the high price pH (λt)
generates a lower expected immediate return than the low price pL(λt) even for small λt’s
(Lemma 1). For an impatient seller the higher expected future return that is associated
with the high price pH (λ1) is not suﬃcient to compensate for the lower immediate return.
Therefore, for an impatient seller the low price pL (λ1) is always uniquely optimal and herding
arises immediately. For a patient seller the borderline case is similar to the case where the
signal is strong. The diﬀerence is that ¯ λα, as deﬁned by (3.1), is zero in the borderline case,
but positive in the case of strong signals.
3.3. The Seller’s Optimal Strategy When the Signal is Weak
For the case of weak signals we show that the seller’s optimal strategy has the following
characteristics.
Proposition 3. Assume that prices are observable. If α2 < 1 − α, there exist discount
factors δ
∗∗ ∈ (0,1) and δ
∗∗∗ ∈ [δ
∗∗,1) such that
• for all δ ∈ [0,δ
∗∗), the uniquely optimal prices are given by pt = pL (λ1) for all t ∈
{1,2,...};
• for δ ∈ [δ
∗∗,δ
∗∗∗],p t = pL (λt) is optimal for all λt ∈ Λ(λ1), but pt = pH (λt) is
optimal as well for at least one λt ∈ Λ(λ1);
• for each δ ∈ (δ
∗∗∗,1) there exist critical probabilities µ∗ ∈ Λ(λ1) and µ∗∗ ∈ Λ(λ1)∪{0},





pH (λt) whenever λt ∈ (µ∗∗,µ ∗)
pL (λt) whenever λt ∈ (0,µ ∗∗) ∪ (µ∗,1);
for λt ∈ {µ∗∗,µ ∗},p L(λt) is optimal, but pH (λt) may be optimal as well; for δ → 1,
µ∗∗ → 0 and µ∗ → 1.
14Proof: Appendix A.1.
An impatient seller will always choose the low price pL (λ1) and trigger herding immedi-
ately, because pL (λ1) generates a higher immediate return (Lemma 1). If the seller is patient,
herding will not occur immediately for priors λ1 that lie within some range (µ∗∗,µ ∗).H o w -
ever, if µ∗∗ > 0, herding will arise eventually. Finally, the case where the seller is patient
and µ∗∗ =0is analogous to the case of strong signals. If the prior λ1 is not too high, there
is a positive probability that herding will not arise. In this event λt converges to zero and it
is asymptotically revealed that the bad state is the true state.
3.4. Summary
When prices are public information herding may but need not arise. Depending on the
parameter constellation, the seller either initiates herding immediately or starts with a high
price, relative to the current public evaluation of the object. In the latter case she continues
to do so as long as the updated public evaluation of the object is within a certain interval.
Along this path the price follows a stochastic process where herding constitutes an absorbing
barrier. The absorbing barrier is optimally chosen by the seller and thus the seller’s problem
can also be seen as one of optimal stopping. As soon as the price exceeds a critical level
and the buyer actually buys at this price, the seller reduces the price somewhat and triggers
herding. However, the price may never hit this critical level. Instead, the price may converge
to zero and thereby reveal that the common value of the object is low. Surprisingly, except
when the quality of the signals is poor, the seller will not trigger herding in order to prevent
the buyers from learning that the true value of the object is low.
A decrease in signal quality α increases the likelihood of herding. For any given proba-
bility λ that the object’s value is high, a decrease in α increases the low price pL (λ) whereas
it decreases αλ, the expected immediate return from the high price. Moreover, the eﬀect of
any given sequence of revealed signal realizations on the price that the seller can achieve,
decreases with α. Therefore, it is intuitively plausible that a decrease in α decreases the ex-
pected immediate and future return associated with the high price relative to the return from
herding. Consequently, the seller’s incentive to trigger herding increases when α decreases.
A decrease in the seller’s degree of patience δ also increases the likelihood of herding, but
the reason is diﬀerent. Whenever the high price pH (λ) generates a lower expected immediate
return than the low price pL(λ), to demand the high price is an investment where some
immediate return is sacriﬁced for a higher expected future return. Thus, only a suﬃciently
patient seller will charge the high price pH (λ), whereas a less patient seller will demand the
low price pL (λ) and trigger herding. Consequently, herding is more likely when the seller is
less patient.
154. Unobservable Prices
In this section we examine the case where it is common knowledge that buyers observe
the history of purchasing decisions but do not observe the price at which these decisions
were made. The price demanded by the seller may be unobservable to later buyers simply
because it is not revealed publicly.12 Or, it may be that prices eﬀectively are unobservable
because buyers rationally recognize that the seller has an incentive to manipulate information
aggregation by oﬀering secret discounts.
The seller observes the full history, and in period t she believes that the likelihood of
the good state equals λt ≡ Pr(ω = G| λ1;Ht−1). For simplicity our notation omits that
λt depends on the buyers’ strategies and beliefs. Buyer t only observes the public history
ht−1 =( a1,...,at−1), where h0 is the empty set. Given the seller’s optimal strategy P : H →
(0,1),b u y e rt updates µt ≡ Pr(ω = G| P;λ1;ht−1,p t) from the public history ht−1, where
for simplicity our notation omits that µt depends also on the strategies and beliefs of the
buyers τ ∈ {1,...,t}. The seller’s beliefs are omitted because given the seller’s strategy they
are not important for the buyers’ inference. Common knowledge of the prior λ1 implies that
µ1 = λ1. In addition, along the equilibrium path of any PBE in pure strategies, buyers can
infer the unobserved prices from the seller’s equilibrium strategy and from the observable
actions of previous buyers. Consequently, in equilibrium the seller and the buyers make the
same inferences from history, and along the equilibrium path µt = λt for all t ∈ {1,2,...}.
If in any period t the seller deviates from her equilibrium strategy P∗, the buyers τ ≥ t + 1
cannot detect this as long as the observable action at is consistent with the seller’s equilibrium
strategy and buyers will still infer µτ ≡ Pr(ω = G| P ∗;λ1;hτ−1,p τ) from the public history.
Hence λt need not equal µt oﬀ the equilibrium path.13
We will show that immediate herding is an equilibrium outcome, and moreover this
outcome is unique when we restrict the seller’s equilibrium strategy (but not her deviation
strategies) to be a pure Markov strategy. We deﬁne a Markov strategy as follows.
Deﬁnition. Ap u r es t r a t e g yP : H → (0,1) of the seller is Markov, if for any history
Ht−1 ∈ H it prescribes a price pt that depends only on λt ≡ Pr(ω = G| λ1;Ht−1) and
12For example, neither the owner of a patent nor the licensee may reveal the price at which the license to
use the patent was sold.
13In the case of unobservable prices our notion of a PBE consists of the requirements for a weak PBE as
deﬁned by Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995, p. 285) plus the requirement that players’ beliefs are
consistent with common knowledge of the structure of the game and of rationality of all players. This implies
that a purchase by some previous buyer cannot be interpreted as indicating that the respective buyer has
observed the bad signal. The reason is that any rational buyer who is willing to accept the seller’s oﬀer after
having observed the bad signal would accept that oﬀer had he instead observed the good signal.
16µt ≡ Pr(ω = G| P ∗;λ1;ht−1,p t).14
We consider only equilibria in pure strategies because equilibria in mixed strategies are
intractable. If the seller uses a mixed strategy at some t, future buyers know only the
probability distribution of the price that was demanded at t, whereas the seller knows the
actual price. Consequently, the seller and the future buyers update their probabilities of
the good state diﬀerently after they have observed the action at of buyer t.S i n c et h ep r i c e
demanded by the seller depends on her updated probability of the good state, which the
buyers cannot infer perfectly, buyers cannot determine previous prices and the analysis soon
gets intractable. In contrast, buyers can perfectly infer all previously quoted prices in a pure
strategy equilibrium.
We ﬁrst show that immediate herding is an equilibrium outcome. In proving existence
of such an outcome we specify the buyers’ strategies and beliefs, and show that for any
λt = µt it is a best response for the seller to charge pt = pL(µt). Consistent beliefs of a buyer
are that the low price was charged when the object was sold, and that the high price was
demanded when it was not sold. That is, buyers τ ∈ {2,3,...} believe that the price b pt that





pL(µt) if at = 1
pH(µt) if at =0
(4.1)
Thus, whenever buyers unexpectedly observe that no sale has taken place, they infer that the
seller has deviated from her equilibrium strategy by demanding the high price. Moreover,
buyers believe that after the deviation the seller continues to quote the low price associated
with the buyers’ updated beliefs. Since buyers always believe that µt = λt,i nw h i c hc a s e
pL(µt) is optimal, these beliefs are consistent with the seller’s strategy. The beliefs (4.1)
of buyer τ are about previous prices and are independent of the present price pτ that the
seller demands from buyer τ. If the seller deviates and unexpectedly demands the high price
pH(µτ) instead of the low price pL(µτ) from any buyer τ, the deviation does not inﬂuence
the respective buyer’s beliefs about the prices that have been previously charged. Similarly,
the observation that no sale has taken place does not induce buyers to revise their belief
that in the past the seller has charged the low price whenever there was a sale. This is
consistent with the buyer’s information. Each buyer’s strategy is to purchase the object,
if and only if the price demanded by the monopolist does not exceed the object’s expected
value conditional on the respective buyer’s information and beliefs.
We show that given the buyers’ strategies and beliefs it is a best response for the seller
14Along the equilibrium path µt = λt =P r ( ω = G| λ1;Ht−1)=P r ( ω = G| λt−1,p t−1,a t−1) for all
t ∈ {2,3,...} is a Markov process.
17to charge pt = pL(µt) whenever µt = λt. Therefore, it is optimal for the seller to charge
the constant price pt = pL(λ1) for all λ1. If the seller optimally charges p1 = pL(λ1) in
period 1, the buyer’s purchase does not reveal any information and the strategic situation is
t h es a m ei np e r i o d2, hence p2 = pL(λ1) is optimal in period 2. Applying the same argument
repeatedly, implies that pt = pL(λ1) is optimal for all t ∈ {1,2,...}, if pL(λ1) is optimal at
t = 1. Hence, to show that immediate herding is an equilibrium outcome, it is suﬃcient to
show that it is not optimal for the seller to deviate and charge p1 = pH(λ1).N o t et h a tg i v e n
buyers’ beliefs as speciﬁed by (4.1), a deviation in any period t to the high price implies
µt+1 ≤ µt,w h e r e a sλt+1 either increases or decreases relative to λt. Furthermore, it must be
that λt ≥ µt, t ∈ {1,2,...}.
If the seller deviates to p1 = pH(λ1), this has three consequences: (i) instead of pL(λ1),
the seller’s expected immediate return in period 1 is ϕ(λ1)pH(λ1), where as before ϕ(λt) ≡
λtα +( 1 − λt)(1 − α) denotes the seller’s probability that buyer t observes the good signal;
(ii) instead of λ2 = λ1, the seller’s updated probability of the good state in period 2 is
λ2 = λ
+
1 > λ1 if there was a sale, and λ2 = λ
−
1 < λ1 if there was no sale in period 1;
(iii) instead of µ2 = λ1, the future buyers’ inference is µ2 = λ1 only if there was a sale, whereas
it is µ2 = λ
−
1 if there was no sale in period 1. Clearly, the third consequence is disadvantageous
for the seller. The ﬁrst consequence is good for the seller if ϕ(λ1)pH(λ1) >p L(λ1) and bad
if ϕ(λ1)pH(λ1) <p L(λ1). Since in any period t the return from the low price is pL(µt),
which is independent of λt, the second consequence is relevant for the seller only if she
considers demanding the high price at some point in the future. However, because of the
second consequence we cannot rule out that the seller deviates even when this reduces the
immediate return in period 1,i . e . ,w h e nϕ(λ1)pH(λ1) <p L(λ1).
Since buyers’ beliefs imply µt ≤ λ1 and thus pH(µt) ≤ pH(λ1), it follows that ϕ(λt)pH(µt) ≤
ϕ(λt)pH(λ1) < αpH(λ1), that is, the seller’s expected immediate return from the high price
is always less than αpH(λ1). Moreover, because pL(µt) ≤ pL(λ1) for all t ∈ {1,2,...}, the
seller’s expected immediate return from the low price can never exceed pL(λ1). Consequently,
if pL(λ1) ≥ αpH(λ1), any deviation from pt = pL(λ1) to pt = pH(λ1) will reduce the seller’s
expected payoﬀ. Simple calculation shows that the condition pL(λ1) ≥ αpH(λ1) is equiva-
lent to λ1 ≥
α3−(1−α)2
α3−(1−α)3 ≡ λα. Thus, whenever λ1 ≥ λα immediate herding is an equilibrium
outcome, irrespective of the seller’s degree of patience. This (suﬃcient) condition is violated
for small priors λ1. However, in the case of weak or borderline signals (i.e., α2 ≤ 1 − α )w e
can extend the result to low priors (i.e., λ1 < λα). The following proposition collects these
results.
Proposition 4. Assume that previous prices are unobservable for buyers. If α2 ≤ 1 − α or
α2 > 1 − α and λ1 ∈ [λα,1), there exists a PBE such that pt = pL(λ1) for all t ∈ {1,2,...}.
Thus, there is a PBE where the seller always charges the price pL(λ1) and herding arises
18immediately at t = 1.
Proof: Appendix A.2.
The intuition for existence of a PBE that irrespective of the seller’s degree of patience has
immediate herding as outcome rests on two arguments. First, a deviation to the high price
at best leaves future buyers’ evaluation of the object unchanged and reduces it with positive
probability. Second, under the assumptions of the proposition the expected immediate return
from the low price exceeds that from the high price. The only beneﬁt the deviation has for
the seller is that she learns the respective buyer’s signal, but under the assumptions of the
proposition that turns out to be without value.
When the expected immediate return from the high price exceeds that of the low price
the situation is diﬀerent. In this case a suﬃciently impatient seller will demand the high
price p1 = pH(λ1) in period 1. However, a patient seller will give more weight to the fact
that future buyers reduce their evaluation of the object whenever no sale occurred. Given
buyers’ beliefs (4.1) the seller’s expected return in the far future is certainly maximized by
always charging the low price. Thus, immediate herding is an equilibrium outcome provided
the seller is suﬃciently patient. This is conﬁrmed by Proposition 5, which covers the cases
not considered in Proposition 4.
Proposition 5. Assume that previous prices are unobservable for buyers. If α2 > 1 − α
and λ1 ∈ (0,λα),t h e r ee x i s t saδ ∈ (0,1) such that for all δ > δ there exists a PBE where
pt = pL(λ1) for all t ∈ {1,2,...}. Thus, there is a PBE where the seller always charges
the price pL(λ1) and herding arises immediately at t = 1, provided the seller is suﬃciently
patient.
Proof: Appendix A.2.
Next we address the question of uniqueness. We will prove that if the seller’s equilibrium
strategy is restricted to be a pure Markov strategy, then immediate herding is the unique
equilibrium outcome of all pure strategy PBE.15 Proving uniqueness is complicated by the
fact that a buyer may reinterpret the public history when confronted with a deviation by the
seller. In particular, a buyer who is charged the low rather than the high price may believe
that the seller has deviated in the past, and thus revise his updating from the public history.
For example, observing a deviation to the low price may convince the buyer that, with the
exception of the cases where no object was sold, the seller has never previously demanded
the high price. Consequently, the respective buyer’s evaluation of the object may decrease
drastically, with the eﬀect that the seller can sell the object only for an extremely low price.
15Alternative pure Markov strategy PBE diﬀer only in the seller’s strategy at nodes that are not reached
in equilibrium.
19Such oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path beliefs act like a punishment of the seller and may support
other equilibria.
We show ﬁrst that there does not exist an equilibrium where the seller always demands
the high price independent of the past history. This result is not only useful to prove
uniqueness, but is also interesting because the strategy to demand the high price is the one
that maximizes social learning, whereas immediate herding implies that there is no social
learning at all. Thus, if there existed a PBE where the seller always demands the high price,
maximal and minimal social learning could both be equilibrium outcomes. Lemma 10 shows
that this is not the case.
Lemma 10. If either (i) αλ1 ≤ λ
−




,o r(ii) δ > b δ for some suﬃciently large b δ ∈ (0,1), then there does not
exist a PBE where for all signal realizations the price is pt = pH (λt) for all t ∈ {1,2,...},
that is, where the seller always demands the high price.
Proof: Appendix A.3.
The reason why we cannot sustain an equilibrium where the high price always is charged is
that the seller has an incentive to deviate to the low price. This deviation cannot be detected
by future buyers and thus will increase the seller’s expected future return. Furthermore, in
the weak and in the borderline case the seller’s expected immediate return also increases when
she deviates to the low price in period 1, hence it is not possible to sustain an equilibrium
where the high price is always charged. In the case of strong signals the seller must sacriﬁce
some immediate return to increase the buyer’s evaluation of the object and the argument is
more complicated. However, at some nodes that are reached with positive probability the
loss in the expected immediate return is suﬃciently low to be outweighed by expected future
gains
To analyze uniqueness we consider only PBE where the seller’s equilibrium strategy is a
pure Markov strategy, that is, in each period t the two conditional probabilities of the good
state, λt and µt, determine the seller’s optimal price pt. Notice that the seller’s deviation
strategies are not required to be Markovian. Whereas the two probabilities λt and µt provide
information that is “intrinsically” relevant for the seller, other aspects of the history Ht−1
can be relevant only if the seller and the buyers have somehow “coordinated on making them
relevant.” It is conceivable that in addition to λt and µt some other aspects of the history
Ht−1 are relevant for the seller because buyer t expects the seller to condition the price pt
on these aspects and “punishes” her if she deviates to a diﬀerent price. Perhaps such a
“coordination on intrinsically irrelevant aspects of the history” can implement a PBE where
the seller does not trigger herding immediately. If such a PBE exists, then the respective
“coordination” acts as a commitment device for the seller not to “cheat” by deviating and
20charging a lower price than prescribed by her equilibrium strategy in order to deceive future
buyers. In our analysis we choose to focus solely on strategies that rely only on information
that is intrinsically relevant.
We consider ﬁrst the case where either α2 ≤ 1 − α or α2 > 1 − α and λ1 ≥ λα.B o t h
cases have in common that along the equilibrium path the expected immediate return from
the low price exceeds that from the high price. The intuition for the uniqueness result is
therefore straightforward. Suppose there is an equilibrium where p1 = pH(λ1). If the seller
deviates and charges p1 = pL(λ1) instead, buyer 1 purchases the object regardless of his
signal and future buyers falsely update µ2 = λ
+
1 . Such a deviation is beneﬁcial for the seller
because her future as well as her immediate expected return increase.
Proposition 6. Assume that previous prices are unobservable for buyers. If either α2 ≤
1 − α or α2 > 1 − α and λ1 ∈ [λα,1), then any pure strategy PBE where the seller’s
equilibrium strategy is Markov has immediate herding, i.e., pt = pL(λ1) for all t ∈ {1,2,...},
as equilibrium outcome. That is, under these conditions immediate herding is the unique
equilibrium outcome.
Proof: Appendix A.4.
Finally, we consider the remaining case where α2 > 1 − α and λ1 < λα.I nt h i sc a s et h e
expected immediate return from the high price exceeds that from the low price in period
1.16 We show that there does not exist a PBE where the seller’s strategy is Markovian and
p1 = pH(λ1), provided the seller is suﬃciently patient. To do this we conjecture a PBE that
has p1 = pH(λ1) and show that this leads to a contradiction if the seller is suﬃciently patient.
Since deviating from p1 = pH(λ1) to p1 = pL(λ1) is now costly for the seller and, moreover,
m a yh a v eo n l yt e m p o r a r yb e n e ﬁcial eﬀects, the intuition that underlies Proposition 6 does
not generally apply even for a very patient seller. In addition, if the seller deviates at some
t>1 from pt = pH(λt) to some other price, buyer t will necessarily notice this deviation and
may conclude that the seller has also deviated previously. In that case buyer t may not be
willing to buy the object for the low price pt = pL(λt) because he revises his beliefs about
the true state. The lowest possible probability of the good state that a rational buyer t may
infer from the public history ht−1 is the one that is based on the assumption that when there
was no sale the respective previous buyer had observed a bad signal, whereas whenever there
was a sale the previous buyer has bought the object only because the seller had deviated to
as u ﬃciently low price. This makes the proof of uniqueness as well as the intuition for it
more complicated. However, it can be shown that for any conjectured PBE that starts with




and therefore the uniqueness proof of Proposition 6 could
be applied for λ1 ≥ ¯ λα as well (and not only for λ1 ≥ λα). However, Proposition 4 on existence relies on
λ1 ≥ λα and because of this we also have to assume λ1 ≥ λα in Proposition 6.
21p1 = pH(λ1) there is some node that is reached with positive probability where the seller
gets a permanent increase in the expected future revenues from deceiving future buyers by
d e v i a t i n gt oas u ﬃciently low price. At such a node the immediate loss from charging a
suﬃciently low price to induce a sale is outweighed by the associated permanent increase in
the expected future revenues, provided the seller is suﬃciently patient. Therefore, such a
seller will deviate at this node and the conjectured equilibrium unravels. Consequently, if
the seller is suﬃciently patient there can be no PBE where the seller’s strategy is Markovian
and p1 = pH(λ1).





,t h e r ee x i s t sa¯ δ ∈ (0,1) such that for each δ > ¯ δ any pure strategy PBE where
the seller’s equilibrium strategy is Markov has immediate herding, i.e., pt = pL(λ1) for all
t ∈ {1,2,...}, as equilibrium outcome. That is, under these conditions immediate herding is
the unique equilibrium outcome.
Proof: Appendix A.4.
Essentially the intuition for uniqueness is that the seller cannot commit not to “cheat” by
charging a lower price than the one prescribed by her equilibrium strategy. With unobserv-
able prices the seller has the option to cheat, except when there is immediate herding; and
in order to mislead future buyers a suﬃciently patient seller will, in fact, cheat at some node
that is reached with positive probability. The only case in which the seller will be unable
to cheat is when there is immediate herding, at least when the seller’s strategy is Markov.
Thus only immediate herding can be sustained as an equilibrium outcome.
5. Secret Discounts and Naïve Buyers
As mentioned in the Introduction, it has been suggested that by oﬀering secret discounts
the seller can strategically mislead buyers to increase their evaluation of the object. The
previous section clearly demonstrates that rational buyers cannot be misled in this way. In
this section, we therefore relax the assumption that buyers are rational and examine the
seller’s incentive to manipulate the aggregation of information when faced with a population
of naïve buyers.
In contrast to our earlier analysis we assume that the monopolist posts a publicly ob-
servable price pt, but may secretly oﬀer a discount dt,w h e r edt ∈ [0,1).T h e o ﬀer to the
buyer still has the form of a “take it or leave it oﬀer,” where the price demanded by the
monopolist equals pt −dt. In each period t the seller knows the full history given by Ht−1 =
(p1,d 1,a 1,...,pt−1,d t−1,a t−1). Given this history she chooses an action (pt,d t) ∈ (0,1)×[0,1).
Buyers observe previously posted prices and the associated actions, but they do not
22observe the secret discounts. We assume that buyers are naïve, in the sense that they are
unaware of even the possibility of secret discounts as long as the seller’s posted prices are
consistent with the optimal strategy of an “honest” seller. Therefore, the seller’s posted
prices must be consistent with the optimal price in the observable prices case. If, incorrectly,
the seller’s posted price is high when it should be low in the observable prices case, the
buyers become aware of the discount possibility and forever thereafter they will believe that
the price actually charged by the seller is low. Being oﬀered a discount does not cause the
same type of belief revision. Rather, when a naïve buyer is oﬀered a discount, he is convinced
by the seller that he is a special customer and that no one before him has ever received a
discount.
Naïve buyers update their beliefs according to the perceived history. The perceived
history is deﬁned as the history of posted prices and actions together with the belief that
posted prices are actually charged as long as the high price is not posted when the low price is
optimal in the observable prices case.17 For each t ∈ {1,2,...} the perceived history is given by
χt =( p1,0,a 1,...,pt,0,a t), which is the full history with all discounts being replaced by zero.
We deﬁne χ0 to be the empty set. Buyer t’s associated updated probability is denoted by
µt ≡ Pr
¡
ω = G| λ1;χt−1
¢
, and the seller’s updated probability by λt ≡ Pr(ω = G| λ1;Ht−1).
The seller perfectly infers µt and posts either the associated high price pH (µt)=µ
+
t or the
associated low price pL (µt)=µ
−
t . Given buyers’ beliefs the seller will post the price that is
optimal in the observable prices case for the realization λt = µt.18 Whenever µt assumes a
value such that pL (µt) would be the seller’s uniquely optimal price in the observable prices
case, the seller posts (and charges) pL (µt) and triggers herding.
Since it is optimal for the seller to actually charge either the high price pH (µt) or the
low price pL(µt), only discounts that reduce the high price pH (µt) to the low price pL (µt)
need be considered. We show ﬁrst that when the expected immediate return from the
low price exceeds that from the high price, then the seller never actually charges the high
price. In particular, she gives a discount dt = pH (µt) − pL (µt) whenever she posts the high
price pH (µt), and thus buyer t actually pays only the low price and buys the object for
sure. Charging the low price causes the seller’s return to increase for two reasons. First,
the immediate return is the low price, which in the case considered exceeds the expected
immediate return from demanding the posted high price; and second, by charging pL (µt) the
seller beneﬁts from the fact that future buyers erroneously infer the good signal realization
st = g from buyer t’s purchase. The seller’s only potential cost from charging the low price
17If the seller posts the low price when the high price should have been posted, buyers believe the posted
price is charged. The buyers maintain this belief in the event that no sale occured at the posted low price.
18Here λt refers to the updated probability of the good state that determines the equilibrium price in the
observable prices case, not to the λt of this section. For simplicity we assume that a seller who is indiﬀerent
between posting the high and the low price always posts the low price.
23is that she doesn’t learn buyer t’s signal, but this foregone knowledge has no value. The
reason is that the seller, by secretly charging the low price, can increase buyers’ beliefs that
the object is of high value, and eﬀectively secure that µt reaches (in ﬁnitely many steps) a
level where the uniquely optimal price is the low price. At this stage all buyers purchase the
object and the true state of the world is irrelevant to the seller.
The condition that in period 1 the immediate expected return from the low price exceeds
that from the high price is that either α2 ≤ 1 − α or α2 > 1 − α and λ1 ≥ ¯ λα.F o r t h e s e
parameter constellations the following proposition shows that whenever the high price is
optimal in the observable prices case, the seller posts the high price and secretly grants a
discount in order to deceive future buyers.
Proposition 8. Assume that the seller may grant secret discounts and buyers are naïve.
Let µ∗ denote the critical probability of Proposition 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and µ∗+ ≡
Pr(ω = G| µ∗,s= g).I f(i) α2 ≤ 1 − α or (ii) α2 > 1 − α and λ1 ∈ [¯ λα,1),t h es e l l e r
immediately posts and actually charges the low price pL (λ1) and triggers herding whenever
this is uniquely optimal in the observable prices case; otherwise she posts the high price
pH (µt) a n dg r a n t sas e c r e td i s c o u n tdt = pH (µt)−pL (µt) for the ﬁrst T periods t ∈ {1,...,T},
where T is a ﬁnite, deterministic integer. In the latter situation, µT+1 = µ∗ if pL(µ∗) is
uniquely optimal at µ∗ when prices are observable, and µT+1 = µ∗+ if pH(µ∗) is also optimal
at µ∗ when prices are observable. In period T + 1 the seller posts and charges pL (µ∗) or
pL (µ∗+), respectively, and triggers herding.
Proof: Appendix A.5.
Finally, we consider the case when the signals are strong and the prior is suﬃciently low
(i.e., α2 > 1 − α and λ1 < ¯ λα). We know that whenever µt gets suﬃciently large the seller
will post and charge the low price. Furthermore, secret discounts allow the seller to increase
the buyers’ public evaluation of the object to the level where herding occurs. However, for
the parameter constellations considered now, the expected immediate return from the high
price exceeds that from the low price, and hence there is a cost associated with oﬀering a
discount and deceiving future buyers. As a result, the price charged by the seller depends
on her discount factor. In particular, a seller that doesn’t value the future will never oﬀer a
discount, whereas a suﬃciently patient seller will have an optimal strategy that prescribes
her to oﬀer discounts at least at some nodes. Notice, however, that in general it will not be
optimal for a patient seller to always oﬀer discounts until she triggers herding. The reason
is that although demanding the high price without a discount may result in a decrease of
future buyers’ evaluations of the object (because there is no sale), the probability that there
is a sale and thus that future buyers’ evaluations increase is still positive and the seller need
not incur the cost of the discount. Moreover, the seller always has the option of granting a
secret discount at a later stage if necessary. Interestingly, there are histories in which even
24a patient seller never cheats.
However, a suﬃciently patient seller will always use secret discounts to prevent buyers’
updated probabilities of the good state from becoming too low. Consequently, buyers’ beliefs
µt will almost surely reach in ﬁnite time a level where the seller triggers herding. This implies
the following result for the parameter constellations that are not covered by Proposition 8.
Provided the seller is suﬃciently patient, herding will occur in ﬁnite time with probability 1.
The intuition behind this result can be seen when considering the case where herding may
realize with a positive probability that is less than 1. This implies that there must be a
positive probability of signal realizations such that the seller becomes increasingly pessimistic
about reaching the true value of this object and thus about her future revenues. However,
by oﬀering secret discounts the seller can prevent buyer’s beliefs from falling below some
threshold. Since from any such threshold there are only ﬁnitely many steps to the herding
region, herding will realize with probability 1.
Proposition 9. Assume that the seller may grant secret discounts and buyers are naïve.
Let µ∗ denote the critical probability of Proposition 1 and µ∗+ ≡ Pr(ω = G| µ∗,s= g).I f








the seller posts (and charges) the price pL (µ∗) in ﬁnite time with probability 1
if pL(µ∗) is uniquely optimal at µ∗ when prices are observable, and posts (and charges)
pL(µ∗+) in ﬁnite time with probability 1 if pH(µ∗) is also optimal at µ∗ when prices are
observable. Thus, herding arises in ﬁnite time with probability 1, provided the seller is
suﬃciently patient.
Proof: Appendix A.5.
If the seller can oﬀer secret discounts and buyers are naïve, then the seller can manipulate
information aggregation. This has the eﬀect that with probability 1 herding will occur in
ﬁnite time. In contrast to the case with observable prices, the bad state will never be asymp-
totically revealed if the seller is suﬃciently patient. Rather than allowing social learning to
reveal the bad state, the seller will post high prices relative to the public information and
secretly grant discounts in order to deceive future buyers. In this way the seller makes sure
that eventually the buyers’ updated probability that the object is of high value exceeds a
critical level. Then, as in the observable prices case, she reduces the posted price somewhat,
triggers herding, and stops giving discounts.19 Some buyers may get discounts from the
19The situation is diﬀerent if, in contrast to our assumption, buyers always believe that the seller charged
the posted price, irrespective of which price is optimal in the observable prices case. It can be shown that
in this case the seller makes sure that eventually the buyers’ updated probability of the object being of high
value exceeds a critical level, and from then on proceeds by always posting the high price and charging the
low price. Consequently, herding never occurs and buyers’ probability µt of the good state will converge to
1 for t →∞ .
25posted prices because in this way the seller can trick future buyers to make false positive
inferences about earlier buyers’ signals. Consequently, whenever the seller initially posts the
high price pH(λ1) the path of posted prices rises, at least eventually. As soon as it exceeds
a critical level, the price drops somewhat and herding occurs.20
6. Summary and Extensions
In addition to the complete characterization of the seller’s optimal pricing policy for the case
of observable prices, our analysis has provided three general insights:
1. If prices are observable, herding will occur with positive probability. However, a suf-
ﬁciently patient seller will trigger herding only if the true state is known with high
probability.
2. If previous prices are unobservable to buyers, herding will be more common than when
prices are observable.
3. If the seller can grant secret discounts and buyers are naïve, a suﬃciently patient
seller will always trigger herding at a relatively high price (and for certain parameter
constellations every seller is suﬃciently patient).
While there may be social learning when both actions and prices are observed, this
does not imply that sellers can manipulate aggregation of information by secretly changing
their prices or hiding them altogether. The only way the seller can manipulate information
aggregation is to trigger herding and thus to end learning. Rather than enabling deception
the seller’s opportunity to cheat will merely inhibit learning. Rational buyers cannot be
fooled. For misleading manipulation to be successful it is necessary that buyers are not
rational.
Next we examine the extent to which our results are inﬂuenced by the assumption that
the seller’s constant marginal cost c equals the minimum value ˆ v (B) of the object. We deal
separately with the case c<ˆ v (B) and the case c>ˆ v(B). In our context the main diﬀerence
between these two cases is that if c>ˆ v (B) it is optimal for the seller to exit the market when
rational buyers have a suﬃciently low estimate of the good state. Another diﬀerence is that
20Our analysis of naïve buyers has focused exclusively on the case where the seller is restricted to making
“take it or leave it oﬀers.” This is not the seller’s preferred strategy when she is faced with buyers who never
anticipate discounts. In such an environment the seller is strictly better oﬀ if she instead ﬁrst quotes the
high price, and then decreases the price to the low price if and only if the respective buyer rejectes the oﬀer.
Since by assumption the buyer does not expect discounts to be given, he will not strategically decline to buy
at the high price. Clearly, if the seller follows such a strategy, the path of posted prices always increases,
until at some point herding occurs.
26if c ≤ ˆ v(B), then from an eﬃciency point of view, every potential buyer should purchase the
object. Thus, if c ≤ ˆ v (B) herding is eﬃcient, and from an eﬃciency point of view the seller
should never charge the high price as long as there are no other reasons to learn the true
state.21 This is so in spite of the fact that herding prevents information aggregation, and the
reason is simply that when c ≤ ˆ v(B) information aggregation is useless. In contrast, if the
cost c exceeds ˆ v(B) b u ti sl e s st h a nˆ v(G), information aggregation is socially valuable.22
Consider ﬁrst the case where c<ˆ v(B) and prices are observable to buyers. For any
λ ∈ (0,1) t h ei m m e d i a t er e t u r nn e to fc o s tf r o mt h el o wp r i c ei sn o wpL(λ)+¯ p, where
¯ p ≡ ˆ v(B)−c>0. This is again a strictly convex function of λ. The expected immediate return




=[ α +( 2 α − 1)¯ p]λ+(1 − α)¯ p, which









pL(λ)+¯ p − {[α +( 2 α − 1)¯ p]λ +( 1 − α)¯ p} it holds that ∆(λ) >p L(λ) − ϕ(λ)pH(λ)=
pL(λ) − αλ for ¯ p>0, and thus the low price is more attractive than in the case ¯ p =0 , i.e.,
t h ec a s ew ea n a l y z e di nS e c t i o n3w h e r ec =ˆ v(B).F o rλ suﬃciently close to 1 the diﬀerence
∆(λ) is positive since ∆(1)=( 1 − α)(1 +¯ p) > 0, which corresponds to the situation in
Section 3. However, the diﬀerence ∆(λ) is positive for suﬃciently small λ’s as well because
∆(0) = α¯ p>0, whereas the respective diﬀerence was zero at λ =0in Section 3 where
¯ p =0 . Consequently, for any δ ∈ [0,1) t h el o wp r i c ei so p t i m a la ts u ﬃciently low as well
as at suﬃciently high values of λ. That is, in contrast to our previous result the seller will
always trigger herding whenever λ is suﬃciently low and prices are observable.




is linear in λ, these two curves
i n t e r s e c ta tm o s tt w i c e .G i v e n¯ p>0, they will not intersect if α is suﬃciently small. Thus,
for those α’s the immediate return net of cost from the low price is always larger than
the expected immediate return net of cost from the high price, and that corresponds to
the case of weak signals in Section 3. On the other hand, if α is suﬃciently large the two
curves will intersect twice. This follows from the combination of two arguments. First,





point on pL(λ)+¯ p from below as α → 1; second, for α close to 1 the slope of pL(λ)+¯ p is




because dpL(λ)/dλ = α2/(1 − α)
2 for
λ = 1 and thus dpL(1)/dλ →∞for α → 1. Those α’s for which the two curves intersect
twice correspond to the case of strong signals in Section 3. Given ¯ p>0, there also exists
an α such that the two curves share a tangential point at some λ ∈ (0,1).H o w e v e r , t h i s
borderline case diﬀers from the one in Section 3 because there the corresponding tangential
point is at λ =0 , which is not attainable.
21This will not be the case if the eﬃcient usage of the object depends on the state.
22If c ≥ ˆ v(G), the good should not, and will not, be produced.
27Applying arguments of the analysis of Section 3 gives the following results for ¯ p>0.
If, given ¯ p>0, the signals are strong or borderline in the sense that there is at least one
λ ∈ (0,1) such that the expected immediate return net of cost from the low and the high
price is the same, then the low price is optimal for the seller for suﬃciently high and low λ’s,
and the high price is optimal for all intermediate λ’s. When δ =0 , the intermediate range
shrinks to the tangential point in the borderline case and both prices are optimal at this
point. If, given ¯ p>0, the signals are weak in the sense that the immediate return net of cost
from the low price exceeds the expected immediate return net of cost from the high price
for all λ ∈ (0,1),t h e nas u ﬃciently impatient seller will charge the low price and trigger
herding immediately. In contrast, a suﬃciently patient seller will charge the low price only
for suﬃciently high and low λ’s, and demand the high price for all intermediate λ’s. Thus,
the results are similar to those of Section 3, with the important modiﬁcation that there will
always be herding at low λ’s and thus herding will arise with probability 1.
It is easy to see that the arguments of Section 4 and 5 carry over to the case where ¯ p>0.
When prices are unobservable to buyers, it cannot be an equilibrium move that a suﬃciently
patient seller charges p1 = pH(λ1), when her equilibrium strategy is a pure Markov strategy.
This follows because she would beneﬁt, if she deviates and demands the low instead of the
high price at some node of any conjectured equilibrium path that starts with p1 = pH(λ1).
If buyers are naive, the seller’s incentives to give secret discounts persist in the case ¯ p>0.
In fact, since the low price is more attractive relative to the high price when ¯ p>0, these
incentives are even higher than in the case ¯ p =0 .
Consider now the case c ∈ (ˆ v(B),ˆ v(G)), i.e., ¯ p ∈ (−1,0). In this case, one of three
alternatives is optimal for the seller in any period t: (i) demand the high price pH(λt),
(ii) charge the low price pL(λt), or (iii) exit the market. We examine ﬁrst the situation
where prices are observable to buyers. If either (ii) or (iii) is optimal in some period t, the
same decision is optimal in all later periods τ >t .M o r e o v e r ,f o r s u ﬃciently small λ’s the
seller’s optimal decision is to exit the market. Thus, for the model to be interesting the prior
λ1 has to be suﬃciently high to make (iii) suboptimal at t = 1. Since the seller has to incur
the cost c only if she is able to sell the object, an increase in the cost c makes alternatives (i)
and (iii) more attractive relative to alternative (ii). A suﬃcient (but not necessary) condition
for (i) to be optimal is pH(λt) > −¯ p ≥ pL(λt). Thus, the seller charges pL(λt) and triggers
herding only if pL(λt) > −¯ p.I f t h e c o s t c is close to ˆ v (G) and pL(λ1) > −¯ p = c − ˆ v(B),
the seller will charge pL(λ1) in t = 1 and trigger herding immediately. Since pL(λ)+¯ p is




is linear (and increasing) in λ, and
since ∆(0) = α¯ p<0 and ∆(1)=( 1 − α)(1 +¯ p) > 0, these two curves intersect exactly
once. Consequently, the seller’s optimal policy is to charge the low price and trigger herding
whenever λt exceeds a critical value (that depends on δ). Depending on the parameters,
28the seller either exits or demands the high price whenever λt is below that critical value.
In the latter case there exists a second critical value of λ, at which the seller exits. Thus,
herding may, but need not occur. In particular, as in the case of Proposition 1, herding will
never arise at small λ’s. However, learning will stop when λt > 0 becomes suﬃciently small
because the seller will exit. These arguments show that with the modiﬁcation that the seller
will exit whenever λt > 0 becomes suﬃciently small, the analysis of Section 3 carries over to
the case ¯ p ∈ (−1,0).23
The same is true for the analysis of Section 4. If the seller is suﬃc i e n t l yp a t i e n t ,ap u r e
equilibrium strategy that is Markov cannot prescribe her to charge p1 = pH(λ1). This follows
because she would beneﬁt, if she deviates and demands the low instead of the high price at
some node of any conjectured equilibrium path that starts with p1 = pH(λ1).24 Finally, the
arguments that underlie the results of Section 5 persist for a cost c ∈ (ˆ v (B), ˆ v(G)).R a t h e r
than using the exit option, a suﬃciently patient seller will grant a secret discount and raise
the buyers’ beliefs about the good state. Consequently, the probability which buyers assign
to the good state will almost surely reach in ﬁnite time a value such that the seller triggers
herding. We conclude from this discussion that the simplifying assumption c =ˆ v(B) about
the seller’s cost is not responsible for the basic results of our analysis.
Another simplifying assumption of our model is that there are only two signal realizations
and that the probability that the signal is correct does not depend on the state. The
“symmetry” of the signal with respect to the two states is helpful for the analysis but not
crucial for our results. Consider the case of K>2 signal realizations instead of 2,w h e r e
K is ﬁnite and no signal realization provides perfect information. In this case the seller is
confronted with K types of buyers. In each period t,t h eo p t i m a lp r i c ew i l lb ee q u a lt ot h e
updated expected value that one speciﬁc (path-dependent) type kt of the K types assigns to
the object, and buyer t will purchase the object if and only if he is of type kt or “higher” (i.e.,
has a higher updated expected value than type kt). Unfortunately the seller’s optimization
problem is not analytically tractable when there are K signal realizations. However, the
intuition for the three general insights listed above carries over to this more general case.
23Ottaviani (1999) studies a case where ¯ p ∈ (−1,0). He normalizes, in our notation, v(B)=−1, v(G)=1 ,
and c =0 , which implies the assumption that c = 1
2[b v(B)+b v(G)]. Because of this assumption on cost, the
seller’s optimal decision at the prior λ1 = 1
2 is to stay in the market and demand the high price. This holds
regardless of the value of α and δ, respectively. However, without this assumption there need not exist a
prior such that the high price is optimal for the seller. If, given α and δ,t h ec o s tc is suﬃciently close to
b v(G), the high price is never optimal. Rather the low price is uniquely optimal for all priors where the seller
does not exit the market, and thus the seller will never demand the high price.
24The proof of Lemma 10 has to be modiﬁed because of the seller’s exit option. But since after exit the
seller’s proﬁts are zero, this can easily be done.
29Consider the second ﬁnding. Whenever prices are unobservable the seller has an incentive
to manipulate information aggregation by deviating to a price which is below the price she
is expected to demand. The fact that the seller may “cheat” and cannot commit not to
cheat, will force her, in equilibrium, to trigger herding when she would not do so in the
case of observable prices. Because of this, herding will be more common when prices are
unobservable. Similarly, the intuition for the other two ﬁndings carries over to the case of
K signals.
Finally, the assumption that there are only two states of nature does not drive the results
either. What matters is the function that maps signal realizations into updated expected
values of the object, not the number of states. As long as the seller and rational buyers
make identical inferences from the history, the structure of the model and therefore the basic
results remain the same.
We conclude that the basic insights of our analysis are fairly robust for the case of a
single seller.
30Appendix
A.1. Proof of Propositions 1, 2, and 3
The proof of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 proceeds in three steps. First, we introduce a function
F (λ) that has the property that whenever F (λ) is positive, the high price pH (λ) is uniquely
optimal. Second, we provide conditions that imply that the low price pL (λ) is uniquely
optimal whenever F (λ) is negative. Third, we show that the set of λ’s where F (λ) > 0
consists of all attainable λ’s that lie in a connected interval, which may be empty. The third
point together with the ﬁrst two points implies that the set of λ’s where the high price is
optimal also lies in a connected interval, which may be empty.
We proceed as follows. First we derive some results that are relevant for the proofs
of all three Propositions. Then we continue with a lemma that we need for the proof of
Proposition 1 and conclude the proof of Proposition 1. Next we prove a lemma that we need
for the proof of Propositions 2 and 3. Finally we prove these two propositions.
Let F (λ) denote the diﬀerence in the seller’s expected discounted return between (i) charg-







the updated probability of the good state may be), from the next period onwards, and





















If F (λ) > 0, then pH (λ) is the uniquely optimal price. The converse does not hold. If
F (λ) < 0 either price may be optimal. However, we show in Lemma 5 that if pH (λ) is






















≤ 0, it can be so only because








> 0. That is, there must be a
sequence of signals and corresponding updated λ’s that lead from b λ to b b λ such that at each
of the updated λ’s the associated high price pH (λ) is optimal.
Given λ1, let λ
l be an arbitrary element in the set Λ(λ1) of attainable λ







s = g | λ
l¢
. We now proceed with a series of lemmas, followed by the proof of
Proposition 1.
31Lemma 4. Given any prior λ1 ∈ (0,1), if the seller is suﬃciently patient, then the high
price is uniquely optimal and herding does not occur immediately, i.e., for each λ1 ∈ (0,1),
∃ ¯ δ < 1 such that V (λ1) > 1




Proof: All we have to show is that for each λ1 ∈ (0,1),F(λ1) > 0 if δ is suﬃciently large.
Rearranging F (λ1) gives
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1 )−pL(λ1)] > 0.F o rδ → 1,t h el a s t
term on the right hand side of the equality becomes arbitrarily large, whereas αλ1 − pL(λ1)
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Vl+k−1 + δϕl+kVl+k+1 for k ∈ {1,...,K − 1}
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1 00 0 ... 00 0
1 − ϕl+1 0 ϕl+1 0 ... 00 0
0 1 − ϕl+2 0 ϕl+2 ... 00 0
− − − − −−−−− − − −
00 0 0 ... 1 − ϕl+K−1 0 ϕl+K−1

















With these deﬁnitions and (6.1) we get
V = L + δAV.
Let I denote the identity matrix. Notice that A is a semipositive square matrix and that
each row sum is 1 (thus A h a saF r o b e n i u sr o o to f1). This and δ ∈ (0,1) imply that the
inverse (I − δA)
−1 exists and is semipositive (see, e.g., Takayama 1974, Theorem 4.D.2, p.
392). Therefore,
V =( I − δA)
−1 L. (6.2)



































































By assumption, V = 1
























































































5 0 for all k ∈ {0,1,...,K} implies
δ
1 − δ





(1 − δ)L 5 (I − δA)P.







Together with (6.2) this gives











,K = 2, where λ
l+k ≡ Pr
¡
ω = G| λ
l,ksignals s = g
¢
,






























,w h e r eλ
l+k ≡ Pr
¡
ω = G| λ
l,ksignals s = g
¢
,b eas e to f










1−δ for all k ∈ {0,1,2}, then pH ¡
λ
l+1¢


















1−δ for k ∈ {0,2}.T h ee x p e c t e d

































> 0 for all λ ∈ (0,λ
0)
=0 for λ = λ
0
< 0 for all λ ∈ (λ
0,1).
The number λ
0 is strictly increasing in δ, λ
0 = ¯ λα for δ =0 , and λ
0 → 1 for δ → 1.
If α2 =( 1 − α), there exists a δ
∗ ∈ (0,1) such that for all δ ∈ [0,δ
∗],F(λ) < 0 for all
λ ∈ (0,1). For each δ ∈ (δ
∗,1) there exists a λ





> 0 for all λ ∈ (0,λ
0)
=0 for λ = λ
0
< 0 for all λ ∈ (λ
0,1).
The number λ
0 is strictly increasing in δ, λ
0 → 0 for δ → δ
∗, and λ
0 → 1 for δ → 1.
If α2 < (1 − α), there exists a δ
∗ ∈ (0,1) such that for all δ ∈ [0,δ
∗),F(λ) < 0 for all
λ ∈ (0,1). For each δ ∈ [δ
∗,1), there exist a λ







> 0 for all λ ∈ (λ
00,λ
0)
=0 for λ ∈ {λ
00,λ
0}




00 is strictly decreasing in δ ∈ [δ
∗,1), λ
0 is strictly increasing in δ ∈ [δ
∗,1).F o r
all δ ∈ (δ
∗,1), λ
00 < λ
0; and for δ = δ
∗, λ
00 = λ
0. For δ → 1, λ
00 → 0 and λ
0 → 1.
Proof: With the deﬁnition G(λ) ≡ ϕ(λ)pL ¡
λ
+¢
+[ 1 − ϕ(λ)]pL ¡
λ
−¢
− pL (λ) we get
F (λ)=αλ−pL(λ)+ δ
1−δG(λ). Since pL ¡
λ
+¢





















































































2 λ + α2 (1 − λ)
λ(1 − λ)
and therefore
G(λ)=( 2 α − 1)
3 λ
2 (1 − λ)
2
[(1 − α)λ + α(1 − λ)]
£
(1 − α)
2 λ + α2 (1 − λ)
¤ .
35Since pL(λ)=λ
−,F(λ)=0if and only if δ
1−δG(λ)=λ
− − αλ. Note that
λ
− − αλ =
(1 − α)(1 − αλ) − α2 (1 − λ)
(1 − α)λ + α(1 − λ)
λ.





2 (1 − λ)
2
(1 − α)




(1 − α)(1 − αλ) − α
2 (1 − λ)
¤
λ .
One solution to (6.4) is λ =0 , but we are looking for solutions λ ∈ (0,1).T h u s w e c a n
multiply both sides of (6.4) by
(1−α)2λ+α2(1−λ)





2 (1 − α)(1 − αλ) − α
4 (1 − λ)+
(1 − α)
3 (1 − αλ)λ
1 − λ
− α
2 (1 − α)
2 λ (6.5)
Next, we show that the left-hand side of (6.5) is strictly concave in λ and the right-hand
side is strictly convex in λ, which in turn implies that there can be at most two diﬀerent
λ’s that satisfy (6.5). Let the left-hand side be denoted by h(λ) ≡ (2α − 1)
3 δ
1−δλ(1 − λ).
Since α > 1/2,h(λ)
00 = −2(2α − 1)
3 δ
1−δ < 0.T h u s ,h(λ) is strictly concave. In addition,
h(0) = h(1)=0 . We denote the right-hand side of (6.5) by k(λ) ≡ α2 (1 − α)(1 − αλ) −
α4 (1 − λ)+( 1 − α)
3 (1−αλ)λ
1−λ − α2 (1 − α)
2 λ. The function k (λ) is strictly convex: all the
linear terms drop out after diﬀerentiating twice and we get k00 (λ)=
2(1−α)
4
(1−λ)3 > 0. Moreover,
k (0) = α2 (1 − α) −α4 and k(λ) →∞for λ → 1.
Consider ﬁrst the case α2 > (1 − α). In this case, k (0) < α2α2 − α4 =0=h(0). Given
the properties of h(λ) and k(λ), this implies that there is exactly one λ ∈ (0,1), denoted
by λ
0, that satisﬁes (6.5) because k(λ) is convex, k (λ) →∞for λ → 1, and h(λ) is strictly
concave. Moreover, G(λ) > 0 because pL (λ) is concave. Consequently, for δ > 0, F (λ)=0




. For δ =0 ,F(λ)=0implies pL(λ) − αλ =0
and therefore λ
0 = ¯ λα. If δ increases, h(λ) increases for every λ ∈ (0,1), whereas k(λ) is
unaﬀected. Thus, λ
0 is strictly increasing in δ. In addition, for every ε > 0 there exists
a( s u ﬃciently large) δ < 1 such that h(1 − ε) >k (1 − ε), and consequently λ
0 > 1 − ε.
Because of this, λ
0 → 1 for δ → 1. For λ ∈ (0,λ
0),h (λ) >k(λ) and therefore F (λ) > 0.
Similarly, F (λ) < 0 for all λ ∈ (λ
0,1).
Next, consider the case α2 =( 1 − α). In this case, k (0) = h(0) = 0. Moreover, h0 (0) =
(2α − 1)
3 δ
1−δ and k0 (0) = −α3 (1 − α)+α4 +( 1 − α)
3 − α2 (1 − α)
2 = α6. Therefore, there
36exists a unique δ
∗ ∈ (0,1) such that h0 (0) = k0 (0). For all δ ∈ [0,δ
∗] no λ ∈ (0,1) solves
(6.5), whereas for all δ ∈ (δ
∗,1) the case is analogous to the case where α2 > (1 − α) except
that ¯ λα =0 .
Finally, consider the case α2 < (1 − α). In this case, k (0) > α2α2 − α4 =0=h(0) and
either (6.5) has no solution i.e., h(λ) <k(λ) for all λ ∈ (0,1), or there are two solutions,
λ
00 ∈ (0,1) and λ
0 ∈ [λ
00,1), that solve (6.5). In the case λ
0 = λ
00 the two solutions are
identical. For all λ ∈ (λ
00,λ














































00 decreases in δ and λ
0 increases






δ solve (6.5) for some ﬁxed δ ∈ (0,1), ad e c r e a s ei nδ implies that λ
00
increases whereas λ
0 as well as λ
0 − λ




this the rest of the lemma follows.
Proposition 1. Assume that prices are observable. If α2 > 1 − α, there exists a critical





pH (λt) whenever λt <µ ∗
pL (λt) whenever λt >µ ∗
For λt = µ∗, pL (λt) is optimal, but pH (λt) may be optimal as well. Moreover, µ∗ > ¯ λα for
δ > 0,µ ∗ =m i n λ∈Λ(λ1)∩[¯ λα,1] λ for δ =0 , and µ∗ → 1 for δ → 1.
Proof : We know that for any λ ∈ Λ(λ1),F(λ) > 0 implies that pH (λ) is uniquely
optimal. We know from Lemma 3 that given δ, V (λ)= 1
1−δpL (λ), if λ is suﬃciently close
to 1. Deﬁne µ∗ as the smallest µ ∈ Λ(λ1) such that for all λ ≥ µ, λ ∈ Λ(λ1), it holds that
V (λ)= 1
1−δpL (λ). Since V (λ) > 1
1−δpL (λ) for all λ < ¯ λα, λ ∈ Λ(λ1),µ ∗ exists and µ∗ ≥ ¯ λα.
We show by contradiction that V (λ) > 1
1−δpL (λ) for all λ <µ ∗, λ ∈ Λ(λ1). Assume that
for some λ <µ ∗, λ ∈ Λ(λ1), it holds that V (λ)= 1
1−δpL (λ), and let λ
l be the largest such




≤ 0 (otherwise pH ¡
λ
l¢
would be uniquely optimal). Hence by
Lemma 7, λ
0 ≤ λ
l and F (λ) < 0 for all λ > λ
l, λ ∈ Λ(λ1). Since by construction λ
l <µ ∗
and V (λ) > 1


















,K ≥ 2, that satisﬁes the



















1−δ . This contradiction proves
that V (λ) > 1
1−δpL(λ) for all λ <µ ∗, λ ∈ Λ(λ1). It follows that pH (λ) is uniquely optimal
for all λ <µ ∗, λ ∈ Λ(λ1). Moreover, because of Lemma 7 and µ∗ ≥ λ
0 (which follows from
F (µ∗) ≤ 0), Lemma 6 implies that only pL (λ) is optimal for all λ >µ ∗, λ ∈ Λ(λ1). The







,w h e r eλ
l−k ≡ Pr
¡
ω = G| λ
l,k signals s = b
¢
,b eas e to f
λ’s such that λ

















1−δ for all k ∈ {1,2,...}.






1−δ for some, but not all k ∈







for all k ∈ {1,2,...}.



















l−1 + δVl for k =0
αλ




Vl−k−1 for k ∈ {1,2,...}.
(6.6)






















1 00 0 .. 00 0 ...
ϕl−1 0 1 − ϕl−1 0 .. 00 0 ...
0 ϕl−2 0 1 − ϕl−2 .. 00 0 ...
− − − − −−−− − − − −−−
00 0 0 ..0 ϕl−k 0 1 − ϕl−k 0 ..
− − − − −−−− − − − −−−
. . . . .... . . . ...
. . . . .... . . . ...






















With I denoting the inﬁnite identity matrix this gives
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With these deﬁnitions, the matrix C deﬁned above, and (6.6) we get
V = L + δCV,
or





5 0 for all k ∈ {0,1,...} implies
δ
1 − δ








(I − δC)P. (6.8)
>From (6.7) and (6.8) we get
(I − δC)V 5
1
1 − δ
(I − δC)P. (6.9)
Deﬁne the inﬁnite vector x =( x1,x 2,...) À 0 by x1 = 1
1−δ,x k = 1 for k ∈ {2,3,...}.
Then the inﬁnite vector z ≡ x(I − δC) has the elements z1 = 1 − δϕl−1 ∈ (0,1],z 2 =
1 − δϕl−2 ∈ (0,1],z k = 1 − δ
¡
1 − ϕl−k+1 + ϕl−k−1
¢
∈ (0,1] for k ∈ {3,4,...}, where
1 − δ
¡
1 − ϕl−k+1 + ϕl−k−1
¢













































l−k−1 < ∞. Since zk ∈ (0,1] for all






l−k−1 < ∞. Multiplying both sides of (6.9)























This contradiction proves the lemma.
Proposition 2. Assume that prices are observable. If α2 = 1 − α, there exists a discount
factor δ
∗ ∈ [0,1) such that for all δ ∈ [0,δ
∗] the uniquely optimal prices are given by
pt = pL (λ1) for all t ∈ {1,2,...}. For each δ ∈ (δ
∗,1) there exists a critical probability





pH (λt) whenever λt <µ ∗
pL (λt) whenever λt >µ ∗
For λt = µ∗, pL(λt) is optimal, but pH (λt) may be optimal as well. Finally, µ∗ → 0 for
δ → δ
∗, and µ∗ → 1 for δ → 1.
Proof: From Lemma 3 we know that given δ,t h el o wp r i c epL(λ) is uniquely optimal
whenever λ is suﬃciently close to 1. By Lemma 7, there exists a δ
∗ ∈ (0,1) such that for all
δ ∈ [0,δ
∗], F (λ) < 0 for all λ ∈ Λ(λ1), and thus Lemma 8 implies that pL(λ) is optimal for
all λ ∈ Λ(λ1). Since for any ε > 0, (0,ε)∩ Λ(λ1) 6= ∅, the rest of the proof of Proposition 2
is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 (note that for α2 =( 1 − α), ¯ λα =0 ).
Proposition 3. Assume that prices are observable. If α2 < 1 − α, there exist discount
factors δ
∗∗ ∈ (0,1) and δ
∗∗∗ ∈ [δ
∗∗,1) such that
• for all δ ∈ [0,δ
∗∗), the uniquely optimal prices are given by pt = pL (λ1) for all t ∈
{1,2,...};
• for δ ∈ [δ
∗∗,δ
∗∗∗],p t = pL (λt) is optimal for all λt ∈ Λ(λ1), but pt = pH (λt) is
optimal as well for at least one λt ∈ Λ(λ1);
• for each δ ∈ (δ
∗∗∗,1) there exist critical probabilities µ∗ ∈ Λ(λ1) and µ∗∗ ∈ Λ(λ1)∪{0},





pH (λt) whenever λt ∈ (µ∗∗,µ ∗)
pL (λt) whenever λt ∈ (0,µ ∗∗) ∪ (µ∗,1);
for λt ∈ {µ∗∗,µ ∗},p L(λt) is optimal, but pH (λt) may be optimal as well; for δ → 1,
µ∗∗ → 0 and µ∗ → 1.
40Proof: From Lemma 3 we know that given δ,t h el o wp r i c epL(λ) is uniquely optimal
whenever λ is suﬃciently close to 1. By Lemma 7, there exists a δ
∗ ∈ (0,1) such that for all
δ ∈ [0,δ
∗), F (λ) < 0 for all λ ∈ Λ(λ1). Hence Lemma 8 implies that pL(λ) is optimal for all
δ ∈ (0,δ
∗). Although F (λ) > 0 for some λ ∈ (0,1) if δ > δ
∗, these λ’s may not be elements
of Λ(λ1) and thus it may still be the case that F (λ) < 0 for all λ ∈ Λ(λ1). Therefore, deﬁne
δ
∗∗ ≥ δ
∗ > 0 as the supremum of δ in the set {δ| F (λ) < 0 for all λ ∈ Λ(λ1)}. Together
with Lemma 6 the deﬁnition of δ
∗∗ implies that for all δ ∈ (0,δ
∗∗),p L (λ) is uniquely optimal
for all λ ∈ Λ(λ1).
Consider now the case δ ∈ (δ
∗∗,1). Recall that F (λ) > 0 implies that pH (λ) is uniquely
optimal. Hence from Lemma 7 we know that if δ ∈ (δ
∗∗,1) is suﬃciently large (and therefore
λ
00 and λ
0 of Lemma 7 are suﬃciently close to 0 and 1, respectively), there exists a λ ∈
Λ(λ1) such that V (λ) > 1
1−δpL(λ).L e t δ
∗∗∗ ≥ δ
∗∗ denote the supremum of δ in the set
©
δ | V (λ)= 1
1−δpL (λ) for all λ ∈ Λ(λ1)
ª
. Continuity implies V (λ)= 1
1−δpL (λ) for all λ ∈
Λ(λ1), if δ = δ
∗∗∗. For any δ ∈ (δ
∗∗∗,1) deﬁne µ∗∗ as the largest µ ∈ Λ(λ1) such that for
all λ ≤ µ, λ ∈ Λ(λ1), it holds that V (λ)= 1
1−δpL (λ), if such a µ exists; otherwise deﬁne
µ∗∗ ≡ 0.D e ﬁne µ∗ as the smallest µ ∈ Λ(λ1) such that for all λ ≥ µ, λ ∈ Λ(λ1), it holds
that V (λ)= 1
1−δpL (λ).T h ed e ﬁnition of δ
∗∗∗ implies µ∗∗ <µ ∗. Since F (µ∗∗) ≤ 0 if µ∗∗ > 0,
and F (µ∗) ≤ 0, Lemma 7 implies F (λ) < 0 for all λ ∈ Λ(λ1) that satisfy either λ <µ ∗∗
or λ >µ ∗.I f µ∗∗ > 0, the part of Proposition 3 that relates to δ ∈ (δ
∗∗∗,1) follows from
Corollary 1 and Lemma 8.
Next consider the case µ∗∗ =0 . Corollary 1 still implies that pL(λ) is optimal for
λ ∈ (µ∗,1). We show by contradiction that pH (λ) is uniquely optimal for all λ ∈ (0,µ ∗).
Assume that pL ¡
λ
0¢
is optimal for some λ







00 because of Corollary 1, Lemma 7, and the deﬁnition of µ∗. Therefore, F (λ) ≤ 0








∩ Λ(λ1).T h i s
implies µ∗∗ ≥ λ
0 > 0 and thus contradicts µ∗∗ =0 . Therefore, pH (λ) is uniquely optimal for
all λ ∈ (0,µ ∗) ∩ Λ(λ1).
Finally, consider the case δ ∈ [δ
∗∗,δ
∗∗∗]. The deﬁnition of δ




1−δpL (λ) for all λ ∈ Λ(λ1) and therefore pL (λ) is optimal for all λ ∈
Λ(λ1). Moreover, the deﬁnitions of δ
∗∗ and δ
∗∗∗, respectively, imply that F (λ)=0for at
least one λ ∈ Λ(λ1) if δ ∈ [δ
∗∗,δ
∗∗∗], and therefore pH (λ) is also optimal for at least one
λ ∈ Λ(λ1).
A.2. Proof of Propositions 4 and 5
Propositions 4 and 5 state that there exists a PBE in pure strategies such that pt = pL(λ1)
for all t ∈ {1,2,...}. The respective equilibrium beliefs of the buyers are given by (4.1),
41and these beliefs are consistent with buyers’ information at all nodes that can be reached
either along the equilibrium path or after deviations of the seller. Given these beliefs, the
optimal strategy of any buyer t ∈ {1,2,...} depends only on µt and st. Consequently, for
the seller all relevant aspects of the history are captured by λt and µt in each period t,
and thus the seller has a best response to the buyers’ strategies and beliefs such that for
each t the seller’s move depends only on λt and µt, i.e., the seller’s best response is Markov.
Because of this, we can employ the value function, which we denote by W (λ,µ), in order to
analyze the seller’s optimization problem. That is, to any (λ,µ) ∈ Λ(λ1) × Λ(λ1), W (λ,µ)
assigns the maximum expected payoﬀ that the seller can achieve by playing a pure Markov
strategy, given buyers’ strategies and beliefs. We have to show that, given buyers’ strategies
and beliefs, the seller’s strategy to charge pt = pL(λ1) for all t ∈ {1,2,...} maximizes her
expected payoﬀ over all pure strategies that are Markov (and thus over all pure strategies,
since the seller’s best response is Markov). For any prior µl and any positive integer k we
deﬁne µl+k ≡ Pr
¡
ω = G| µl,ksignals s = g
¢
and µl−k ≡ Pr
¡





l−k, respectively. First we prove the following Lemma.
Lemma 9. Let α2 ≤ 1 − α. Assume that each buyer t believes that the seller has charged




to each previous buyer τ <twho has purchased the object, and the




to each previous buyer τ <twho has not purchased the object. If for











































































.T h u s ,
pH ¡
µl¢











































1−δ . In addition, we know that ϕ(λ) < α for


































































































































































> 0,i tm u s tb et h a t
α−ϕ(µl)
1−ϕ(µl) > 1, which contradicts α < 1.T h i s
contradiction proves the lemma.
Proposition 4. Assume that previous prices are unobservable for buyers. If α2 ≤ 1 − α or
α2 > 1 − α and λ1 ∈ [λα,1), there exists a PBE such that pt = pL(λ1) for all t ∈ {1,2,...}.
Thus, there is a PBE where the seller always charges the price pL(λ1) and herding arises
immediately at t = 1.
Proof: We show that there exists a PBE where the seller charges the price pt = pL(µt)
whenever µt = λt. All buyers j ∈ {τ + 1,...} believe that in each period t ∈ {1,...,τ} the price
b pt of (4.1) was demanded. Each buyer t buys the object if and only if pt ≤ Pr(ω = G| µt,s t).
Obviously the buyers’ strategies are optimal after every history of actions. If pt = pL(µt)
whenever µt = λt, then the buyers’ beliefs are consistent with Bayesian updating and the
seller’s equilibrium strategy and observed actions. Thus, we have to show that given the
buyers’ strategies and beliefs it is optimal for the seller to charge pt = pL(µt) whenever
µt = λt . W ed os ob yp r o v i n gt h a tt h e r ei sn oλ1 ∈ (0,1) such that it is optimal for the
seller to deviate from pL(λ1) and instead charge p1 = pH(λ1).L e tµl ≡ λ1.
Consider ﬁrst the case where α2 ≤ 1 − α. Recall that, in this case ϕ(µ) pH (µ) <p L(µ)
for all µ ∈ (0,1). We prove the result by contradiction. Assume that p1 = pL ¡
µl¢
is not









































> 0, i.e., pL ¡
µl−1¢
is not optimal at (λt,µ t)=
¡
µl−1,µ l−1¢

























= γ > 0.













> γ > 0 for all k ∈ {0,1,...}.











































This contradiction implies that it is a best response for the seller to charge the price pt =
pL(µt) whenever µt = λt, and thus proves Proposition 4 for α2 ≤ 1 − α.
Next, we show that immediate herding also is an equilibrium outcome when α2 > 1 − α
and λ1 ∈ [λα,1),w h e r eλα ≡
α3−(1−α)2
α3−(1−α)3. We show by contradiction that the seller has no
incentive to deviate from p1 = pL(µl),w h e r eµl ≡ λ1. Suppose p1 = pL ¡
µl¢
is not optimal
















Straightforward calculation shows that µl ≥ λα is equivalent to pL(µl) ≥ αpH(µl). Thus,
pL(µl) ≥ αpH(µl) > ϕ(µl)pH(µl).I f pH(µl) is optimal at (λ,µ)=( µl,µ l),t h e npH(µl)
is optimal at (λ,µ)=( µl+k,µ l) for all k ∈ {1,2,...}, because W(µl+k,µ l) ≥ W(µl,µ l).
Therefore,
αpH(µl)
1−δ >W(µl+1,µ l) ≥ W(µl−1,µ l−1). Thus, the deviation from the low price is
optimal only if pL(µl) < αpH(µl), which contradicts λ1 ≥ λα.
Proposition 5. Assume that previous prices are unobservable for buyers. If α2 > 1 − α
and λ1 ∈ (0,λα),t h e r ee x i s t saδ ∈ (0,1) such that for all δ > δ there exists a PBE where
pt = pL(λ1) for all t ∈ {1,2,...}. Thus, there is a PBE where the seller always charges
the price pL(λ1) and herding arises immediately at t = 1, provided the seller is suﬃciently
patient.
Proof: All buyers j ∈ {τ + 1,...} believe that in each period t ∈ {1,...,τ} the price b pt of
(4.1) was demanded. Each buyer t buys the object if and only if pt ≤ Pr(ω = G| µt,s t).
Obviously the buyers’ strategies are optimal after every history of actions. Furthermore, if
44pt = pL(µt) whenever µt = λt, then the buyers’ beliefs are consistent with Bayesian updating
and the seller’s equilibrium strategy and observed actions. Thus, we have to show that given
the buyers’ strategies and beliefs it is optimal for the seller to charge pt = pL(µt) whenever
µt = λt, which implies that p1 = pL(λ1) for all λ1 ∈ (0,1).
We need to show that for all λ1 < λα there exists a δ ∈ (0,1) such that for all δ > δ there
exists a PBE where pt = pL(λ1) for all t ∈ {1,2,...}. We prove this by contradiction. Notice
that (because ϕ(λ) increases in λ)i ff o rs o m ep a i r(λ,µ) the high price pH(µ) is optimal,
this price must also be optimal for any pair (λ
0,µ) where λ
0 > λ.
Let µl ≡ λ1. We distinguish between three cases that exhaust all possibilities of potentially
proﬁtable deviations by the seller: (i) The seller demands the high price pH(µl) until for the
ﬁrst time a buyer refuses to buy, and the low price pL(µl−1) thereafter; (ii) the seller demands
the high price pH(µl) until the for the ﬁrst time a buyer refuses to buy, then demands the
high price pH(µl−1) until for the second time a buyer refuses to buy, and demands the low
price pL(µl−2) thereafter; (iii) relative to the respective buyer’s belief µl−k,k∈ {0,1,2}, the
seller demands the high price pH(µl−k) until three buyers have refused to buy, and some
price pt ≤ pH(µl−3) thereafter. All cases that are not covered by (i) and (ii) are included in
(iii), because buyer’s beliefs imply µt+1 ≤ µt for all t.
For any probability ψ =P r( ω = G) of the good state and any k ∈ {1,2,...} let
πk (ψ) ≡ Pr[s1 = ... = sk−1 = g,sk = b| ψ]=( 1 − α)α
k−1ψ + α(1 − α)
k−1(1 − ψ)
denote the probability conditional on ψ that out of k buyers the ﬁrst k −1 observe the good





















1 − (1 − α)δ
.
Moreover, α > 1/2 implies 1−α
1−αδ ≤ α







every ψ ∈ [0,1].
Case (i): Let the expected payoﬀ from the deviating strategy that is described under (i)






















45The expected payoﬀ from the equilibrium strategy is 1
1−δ pL(µl). From
P∞






















































(1−α)2, dividing both sides of the inequality by pL(µl) gives
(1 − δ)
α3
(1 − αδ)(1 − α)2 +
αδ




Since for δ → 1 t h el e f th a n ds i d ec o n v e r g e st o
pL(µl−1)
pL(µl) < 1, this inequality cannot hold if δ is
suﬃciently large. This proves that the deviating strategy does not lead to a larger expected
payoﬀ than always charging the low price pL(µl),p r o v i d e dδ is suﬃciently large.
Case (ii): Let the expected payoﬀ from the deviating strategy that is described under (ii)


































is the seller’s expected payoﬀ at t+1, if her ﬁrst failure to sell at the high price had occurred
at t. After this has happened at some t, the seller’s strategy resembles the strategy in case (i),
and thus ˆ U(t,µl−1) resembles ˆ U(i).














































































































































Following the same approach as in case (i), this implies
(1 − δ)
α3













which cannot hold if δ is suﬃciently large. Consequently, ˆ U(ii) < 1
1−δpL(µl) for suﬃciently
large δ.
Case (iii): This case includes all strategies where the seller charges the high price until
three buyers have revealed a bad signal. Let ˆ U(iii) denote the maximum expected payoﬀ that
the seller can achieve by deviations of this type. The proof that for a suﬃciently patient
seller none of these deviating strategies results in a higher expected payoﬀ than 1
1−δpL(µl), is
again similar to the proofs for the cases (i) and (ii). The only diﬀerence is the continuation
value term since we don’t specify whether the seller charges the high or the low price at
nodes (λ,µ l−3). However, since W(λ,µ l−3) ≥ W(λ,µ l−K) for all K ≥ 3, we need only focus
on an upper bound for W(λ,µ l−3).L e tt, τ, and k, respectively, denote the (random) period
when for the ﬁrst, the second, and the third time, respectively, a buyer has revealed a bad
signal. Thus at T ≡ t + τ + k + 1 buyers’ beliefs become µl−3 and the optimal price is
bounded from above by pH(µl−3)=µl−2 = pL(µl−1). It follows that for any realization T the












































where the second (third) sum relates to the continuation value after buyer t (buyers t and






















































Following the same approach as earlier, this inequality and some calculation shows that
ˆ U(iii) > 1
1−δpL(µl) implies
(1 − δ)α3

















We conclude again that for suﬃciently large δ it is not possible that ˆ U(iii) > 1
1−δpL(µl).
It follows that for suﬃciently large values of δ it is a best response for the seller to
charge the low price pL(µl) in each period. Hence there exists a δ ∈ (0,1) such that for








´ < 1, δ can be chosen independently of λ1 ∈ (0,λα).
A.3. Proof of Lemma 10
Lemma 10. If either (i) αλ1 ≤ λ
−




,o r(ii) δ > b δ for some suﬃciently large b δ ∈ (0,1), then there does not
exist a PBE where for all signal realizations the price is pt = pH (λt) for all t ∈ {1,2,...},
that is, where the seller always demands the high price.
Proof: We ﬁrst show that the Lemma holds when αλ1 ≤ λ
−
1 . The proof is by contradiction.

































where the last equality follows because {λt}
∞
t=1 is a martingale and thus E (λt | λ1)=λ1.
Consider the following deviation of the seller. The seller demands the low price p1 =
pL (λ1)=λ
−
1 instead of the high price pH (λ1) in period 1, and after that the seller always
demands the high price, i.e., pt = pH (µt) for all t ∈ {2,3,...}, where µt is the inference of
buyer t from the history of actions. Since buyer t ∈ {2,3,...} cannot observe the seller’s
deviation, he will update according to the seller’s equilibrium strategy, pt = pH (λt) for all
48t ∈ {1,2,...}, which in particular implies that he believes that p1 = pH (λ1). To distinguish
the stochastic process of the seller’s beliefs that is generated by the deviating strategy from
the respective stochastic process {λt}
∞
t=2 that is generated by the equilibrium strategy, we





. Thus, when the seller deviates her beliefs at t ≥ 2 are given
by ˆ λt, and the respective inference of buyer t is given by µt = ˆ λ
+
t ,t∈ {2,3,...}. Denoting
the seller’s expected payoﬀ from the deviating strategy by b U we get































































































t +( 1 − α)
³
1 − ˆ λ
+
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t−1γtαˆ λt | λ1
#
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is a martingale where ˆ λ2 = λ1,
























It must hold that U ≥ b U, and thus αλ1 > λ
−
1 . This proves that the strategy pt = pH (λt) for
all t ∈ {1,2,...} cannot be an equilibrium strategy whenever αλ1 ≤ λ
−
1 .
Consider now the case αλ1 > λ
−




. We proceed in
two steps. First, we show that if λ1 is suﬃciently small, a suﬃciently patient seller will
immediately deviate from the hypothetical equilibrium strategy and demand the low price





as u ﬃciently patient seller will deviate from the hypothetical equilibrium
strategy at some node that is reached with positive probability.
For the ﬁrst step we consider the deviation where the seller demands the low price pL (λ1)






thereafter. If s1 = g, the deviating seller demands
49the same price that she would have demanded along the equilibrium path and receives the
same expected revenue in period t =2a n di na l ls u b s e q u e n tp e r i o d s .I fs1 = b, the deviation
to pL(λ1) in period 1 results in a higher expected revenue in each period t ∈ {2,3,...}. Thus,
i ft h ee x p e c t e dg a i ni np e r i o dt =2alone compensates for the expected loss in period t = 1,
then the seller will deviate. For s1 = b and s2 = b, the seller’s revenue in period 2 is zero,
since in this case there is no sale. The remaining case is s1 = b, s2 = g, which ex ante has

















if she has deviated in period 1.
Therefore, a necessary condition for the seller not to deviate is
αλ1 − λ
−











The necessary condition that no seller, however patient, deviates is that
0 ≤ αλ1 − λ
−










= λ1 − (1 − α)
2 λ1 − λ
−






= λ1 − (1 − α)
2 λ1 −
1 − α
(1 − α)λ1 + α(1 − λ1)
λ1 −
α3 (1 − α)
α2λ1 +( 1 − α)





(1 − α)λ1 + α(1 − λ1)
+ α
α2 (1 − α)
α2λ1 +( 1 − α)
2 (1 − λ1)
+( 1 − α)
2 ≤ 1. (6.12)
Since 1
(1−α)λ1+α(1−λ1) > 1
α > 1 for all λ1 and
α2(1−α)
α2λ1+(1−α)
2(1−λ1) ≥ 1 for suﬃciently small λ1
(because this ratio converges to α2
(1−α) > 1 for λ1 → 0), the inequality (6.12) is violated if
λ1 is suﬃciently small. For λ1 → 0 the left hand side of (6.12) becomes 1−α
α + α3
(1−α). If we
deﬁne ˆ δ by 1−α
α + ˆ δ α3
(1−α) = 1, then 1−α
α + δ α3
(1−α) > 1 for all δ > ˆ δ, and thus for each δ > ˆ δ
there exists a suﬃciently small λ1 such that the seller will deviate from the hypothetical
equilibrium strategy.
Finally, consider a prior λ1 where (6.12) is satisﬁed. Let λ
l ≡ λ1. The previous analy-
sis implies that for each δ > ˆ δ there exists a λ
l−K that is “K steps below λ1”, i.e.,
λ
l−K ≡ Pr(ω = G| λ1,K signals s = b), such that the inequality (6.12) is violated when








α3 (1 − α)
α2λ
l−K +( 1 − α)
2 ¡
1 − λ
l−K¢ +( 1 − α)
2 > 1. (6.13)
The realization st = b for all t ∈ {1,...,K} has positive probability and gives λK+1 = λ
l−K
along the equilibrium path. If in t = K + 1 the seller deviates and demands pL (λK+1)
50instead of pH (λK+1), buyer K +1 observes the deviation, but will nevertheless purchase the
object for the price pL (λK+1) because the only rational inference from the public history
hK =( 0 ,...,0) is pt = pH (λt) and st = b for all t ∈ {1,...,K} and thus λK+1 = λ
l−K even
though pK+1 = pL(λK+1) diﬀers from the equilibrium price pH (λK+1). That is, buyer K +1
will rationally believe that the seller deviates in period t = K + 1 for the ﬁrst time. Buyers
τ ≥ K +2a r eu n a b l et oo b s e r v et h es e l l e r ’ sd e v i a t i o ni np e r i o dt = K + 1 and thus will
buy the object at the respective high price if and only if sτ = g. Consequently, the previous
analysis with λ1 being replaced by λK+1 = λ
l−K applies, and because of (6.13) the seller will
deviate.
A.4. Proof of Propositions 6 and 7
Proposition 6. Assume that previous prices are unobservable for buyers. If either α2 ≤
1 − α or α2 > 1 − α and λ1 ∈ [λα,1), then any pure strategy PBE where the seller’s
equilibrium strategy is Markov has immediate herding, i.e., pt = pL(λ1) for all t ∈ {1,2,...},
as equilibrium outcome. That is, under these conditions immediate herding is the unique
equilibrium outcome.
Proof: Existence follows from Proposition 4. Notice that αλ1 ≤ λ
−
1 , since α2 ≤ 1 − α or
α2 > 1−α and λ1 ≥ λα ≥ ¯ λα. The proof of uniqueness is by contradiction. Assume that there
is a pure strategy PBE where the seller’s equilibrium strategy is Markov and p1 = pH(λ1). The
seller’s equilibrium strategy prescribes for each λt ∈ Λ(λ1) ap r i c ep∗(λt),a n db ya s s u m p t i o n
p∗(λ1)=pH(λ1). Lemma 10 and the assumption that the seller’s equilibrium strategy is
Markov imply that along the equilibrium path herding must occur at some attainable λL < λ1
or at some attainable λH > λ1, or both. Assume ﬁrst that there is a pure strategy PBE






pH(λt) for λt > λL
pL(λt) for λt = λL
and λt ≥ λL for all t. For any t, let χt ≡ Pr(λt = λL | λ1) < 1 denote the probability that
λt = λL and thus pt = pL(λL). The seller’s expected revenue in period t conditional on λt is
αλt if λt > λL, and pL(λL) if λt = λL. Since the stochastic process {λt}
∞
t=1 is a martingale,
the seller’s expected revenue in any period t conditional on λ1 is
E [p
∗(λt)at | λ1]=χtp
L(λL)+( 1 − χt)E [αλt | λ1,λt > λL]
= χtp





















where the last inequality follows from the facts that λL < λ1, and that the assumptions of
the proposition imply, pL(λ1) − αλ1 > 0, and pL(λL) − αλL <p L(λ1) − αλ1. It follows that
the seller’s expected payoﬀ from her equilibrium strategy is less than 1
1−δpL(λ1). But the
seller can guarantee herself a payoﬀ of 1
1−δpL(λ1) by charging pL(λ1) in each period. The
reason is that µt ≥ λ1 for any buyer t who observes purchases from all previous buyers.
This proves that in a PBE that satisﬁes the assumptions of the proposition there must be
herding at some attainable λ ≥ λ1. Let λH denote the lowest attainable λ ≥ λ1 where
herding occurs. If the PBE prescribes the seller to demand the high price for all λt < λ1,
i.e., if for λt < λ1 there is no herding, deﬁne λL ≡ 0; otherwise let λL denote the highest
attainable λ < λ1 for which the PBE prescribes the low price and thus herding. Assume
that there exists a PBE that satisﬁes our assumptions and has λH > λ1. Deﬁne the integer
K by Pr(ω = G| λ1,K signals s = g)=λH, i.e., λH is “K steps above λ1.”C o n s i d e rt h e
seller’s deviation to charge pL(λ1) in the ﬁrst K periods, i.e., t ∈ {1,...,K} and pL(λH)
thereafter. Since for any buyer t ∈ {1,...,K} the minimum estimated probability for the
good state is λ1 and since buyers t ∈ {K + 1,...} cannot observe the seller’s deviation, at = 1
for all t. Moreover, starting with t = K +1 the seller gets the maximum per period revenue
pL(λH)=λ
−





1−δpL(λH). If the seller follows the equilibrium strategy, her expected
revenue in period t ∈ {1,...,K} conditional on λ1 is either E [p∗ (λt)at | λ1,λL < λt < λH]=
E [αλt | λ1,λL < λt < λH] or pL(λL), since it takes at least K + 1 periods to get herding at
λH and thus either λL < λt < λH or λt = λL. Repeating the argument employed above we






1−δpL(λH)=b U. This contradicts the assumption that
there is a PBE that satisﬁes our assumptions and has λH > λ1. Consequently, λH = λ1,
i.e., under the assumptions of the proposition pt = pL(λ1) for all t ∈ {1,2,...} is the only
equilibrium outcome.





,t h e r ee x i s t sa¯ δ ∈ (0,1) such that for each δ > ¯ δ any pure strategy PBE where
the seller’s equilibrium strategy is Markov has immediate herding, i.e., pt = pL(λ1) for all
t ∈ {1,2,...}, as equilibrium outcome. That is, under these conditions immediate herding is
the unique equilibrium outcome.
52Proof: Existence follows from Proposition 5 for all δ > δ. For uniqueness consider ﬁrst the
case where λα ≤ λ1 < λα. In this case, αλ1 ≤ λ
−
1 and hence the proposition follows from a
proof identical to that provided for Proposition 6.
Next consider the case where λ1 < λα. The proof is by contradiction. Assume there is
aP B Ew i t had i ﬀerent equilibrium outcome. Denote the respective equilibrium prices by
p∗ (λt), λt ∈ Λ(λ1). By assumption, p∗ (λ1)=pH (λ1).L e tλL denote the largest attainable
λ < λ1 such that p∗ (λ)=pL (λ), if such a λ exists, and deﬁne λL ≡ 0 otherwise. Sim-
ilarly let λH denote the smallest attainable λ > λ1 such that p∗ (λ)=pL(λ), if such a λ
exists, and deﬁne λH ≡ 1 otherwise. That is, if λL > 0 there is herding at λL below λ1,
and if λH < 1 there is herding at λH above λ1. Along the equilibrium path, λL ≤ λt ≤ λH
for all t ∈ {1,2,...}. The PBE generates a particular martingale {λt}
∞






. We consider the deviation where the seller demands pL(λ1) instead of
p∗ (λ1)=pH(λ1) in period 1 and “mimics” the PBE from period 2 onwards by demanding
























, where ˆ λt denotes the seller’s estimation
Pr(ω = G| λ1;Ht−1) along the deviation. Buyer t ∈ {2,3,...} cannot observe the seller’s
deviation at t = 1 and therefore estimates the probability of the good state to be ˆ λ
+
t for each
ˆ λt ∈ Λ(λ1).
Deﬁne (in slight abuse of notation) the function a(st),s t ∈ {b,g}, by a(st)=0for
st = b and a(st)=1 for st = g, and let d
³
ˆ λt,e λt,s t
´
denote the diﬀerence in the seller’s
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In period 1 the deviation generates the revenue pL(λ1), whereas p∗ (λ1)=pH (λ1) generates
the expected revenue αλ1 >p L(λ1). Consider the diﬀerence in period revenues for t ∈
{2,3,...}. If s1 = g, e λt = ˆ λ
+
t and thus the buyers’ beliefs and the seller’s prices along the
equilibrium path are identical to the buyer’s beliefs and seller’s prices along the deviating
path for all t ∈ {2,3,...}. Consequently, the seller’s revenue is identical along the equilibrium
and the deviating path, i.e., d
³
ˆ λt,e λt,s t
´
=0for all t ∈ {2,3,...} for each realization of
signals (s1,s 2,...)=( g,s2,s 3,...).
Consider now the case s1 = b. In this case, e λt = ˆ λ
−
t for all t ∈ {2,3,...} as long as
λL < ˆ λ
+
t < λH and λL < e λt < λH, i.e., provided neither at the equilibrium path nor at the
53deviating path herding has occurred. Notice that e λt = λH implies that λL < e λτ ≤ ˆ λ
+
τ for all
τ ∈ {1,...,t} and ˆ λ
+
t = λH because whenever e λt = λH, ˆ λ
+
τ = λH at some τ <t ,i.e., herding
at λH along the equilibrium path implies herding at λH along the deviating path. Similarly,
herding at λL along the deviating path implies herding at λL along the equilibrium path
because whenever ˆ λ
+
t = λL i tm u s tb et h ec a s et h a te λτ = ˆ λ
−
τ = λL in some earlier period
τ <t .These arguments imply that in the case s1 = b,
d
³
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a(st) if λL < ˆ λ
+
t < λH and λL < e λt < λH
0 if ˆ λ
+







a(st) − pL(λL) if λH > ˆ λ
+
t > e λt = λL




a(st) if λH = ˆ λ
+
t > e λt > λL
pL (λH) − pL (λL) if ˆ λ
+
t = λH and e λt = λL



















































ˆ λt,e λt,s t
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t if λL < ˆ λ
+
t < λH and λL < e λt < λH
0 if ˆ λ
+







ˆ λt − λ
−
L if λH > ˆ λ
+
t > e λt = λL
λ
−
H − α˜ λt if λH = ˆ λ
+





L if ˆ λ
+
t = λH and e λt = λL
for all t ∈ {2,3,...}. Next, we show that unless ˆ λ
+
t = λL or e λt = λH the terms on the right









t > 0. Second, because λ
+
L ≤ λ1 and αλ >
λ






















































ˆ λt − λ
−
L > 0 for ˆ λ
+
t > λL. Third, λ
−
H − αe λt ≥ (1 − α)λ
−
H > 0 for









≥ 0 for all t ∈ {2,3,...}. (6.14)
Thus, for t ≥ 2 the expected future return from the deviation exceeds the respective return
from the equilibrium strategy. Whenever this future gain is suﬃcient to compensate for the
loss from deviating in the ﬁrst period the seller will deviate. We distinguish between several
cases and show that in each case the deviation is beneﬁcial for a suﬃciently patient seller.
54First, consider the case λH = λ
+
1 . That is, along the equilibrium path the seller triggers
herding as soon as e λt = λ
+






= λ1 f o rs u r ei ne a c hp e r i o dt ∈ {2,3,...}. If the seller follows the equilibrium
strategy her revenue in period t depends on e λt. In particular, if e λt ≤ λ1 for all t,t h e
seller receives an expected revenue that is bounded from above by αλ1 < λ1 in each period
t ∈ {2,3,...}. Let π (λ1) ≡ Pr
³
e λt ≤ λ1 for all t| λ1
´
> 0 denote the probability of the event
n
e λt ≤ λ1 for all t
o
. Since π (λ1) decreases in λ1, ¯ π ≡ π
¡¯ λα
¢





Hence an equilibrium where λ
+






λ1 − (1 − ¯ π)
δ
1 − δ


















¯ π(1 − α).
There exists a ˆ δ1 ∈ (0,1) that is independent of λ1 such that this inequality is violated for
all δ > ˆ δ1.
Next, consider the case λL = λ
−
1 and λH > λ
+
1 . That is, along the equilibrium path the
seller triggers herding as soon as e λt = λ
−
1 , but not when e λt = λ
+
1 . If s1 = b, the seller’s





in period t =2 , whereas the expected revenue




















. Hence an equilibrium
where λ
−
1 = λL can only be sustained if αλ1 − λ
−











































α2λ1 +( 1 − α)





1−α > 1 for λ1 → 0, there exists a ¯ λ1 > 0 and an ε > 0 such
that
(1−α)α2











α2λ1+(1−α)2(1−λ1) > 1 for all δ > ˆ δ2 ≡ 1
1+² ∈ (0,1). Thus, if the seller is suﬃciently
patient, p∗ (λ1)=pH (λ1) implies that λ1 ≥ ¯ λ1 for some ¯ λ1 > 0. We continue the proof by
showing that if the seller is suﬃciently patient, λ1 ≥ ¯ λ1 leads to a contradiction as well.





1 denote the probability “one step below λ
−




















in each period t ∈ {2,3,...}, whereas the expected revenue of the deviating seller
in period t conditional on ˆ λ
+































































1 for all t| λ1,s 1 = b
´
> 0 denote
the probability that conditional on s1 = b herding at λL = λ
−
1 will not occur along the
deviating path. Given λ1, this probability is lowest when λH = 1, and this lower bound
increases in λ1. Therefore, there exists a ¯ χ > 0 such that χ(λ1) > ¯ χ for all λ1 ≥ ¯ λ1. Thus,
















probability 1− ¯ χ. Hence if λ1 ≥ ¯ λ1 an equilibrium where p∗ (λ1)=pH (λ1) and λ
−
1 = λL can
only be sustained if
αλ1 − λ
−




















































There exists a ˆ δ3 ∈ (0,1) that is independent of λ1 ∈
£¯ λ1, ¯ λα
¢
such that this inequality is
violated for all δ > ˆ δ3.
Consider now the case where 0 < λL < λ
−
1 . That is, along the equilibrium path the seller
triggers herding at some λL =P r( ω = G| λ1,K signals s = b) that is “K steps below λ1,”
where K ≥ 2. The event that the ﬁrst K − 1 buyers all receive bad signals has positive
probability. If the seller follows the equilibrium strategy and that event realizes, the ﬁrst















The remaining case is the one where λL =0and λH > λ
+
1 . Because of (6.14) the argument
of the proof of Lemma 10 that led to the inequalities (6.12) and (6.13), respectively, applies
here as well. Consequently, there exists a ˆ δ4 ∈ (0,1) that is independent of λ1 such that the
seller will deviate whenever δ > ˆ δ4.
Deﬁne ¯ δ ≡ max
³
ˆ δ1,ˆ δ2,ˆ δ3,ˆ δ4
´
. We have shown that the assumption that there exists a
pure strategy PBE where the seller’s equilibrium strategy is Markov and where p∗ (λ1)=
pH (λ1), leads to a contradiction whenever δ > ¯ δ, where ¯ δ is independent of λ1.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
p∗ (λ1)=pL (λ1) in any such PBE and the proposition follows.
A.5. Proof of Proposition 8
Given buyers’ beliefs, in each period t all aspects of the history that are relevant for the
seller, are captured by λt and µt. Therefore, the seller has a best response to the buyers’
strategies and beliefs such that for each t the seller’s move depends only on λt and µt, i.e., a
56best response that is Markov. Because of this, we can employ the value function, which we
denote by W (λ,µ), in order to analyze the seller’s optimization problem. That is, to any
(λ,µ) ∈ Λ(λ1) × Λ(λ1), W (λ,µ) assigns the maximum expected payoﬀ that the seller can
achieve by playing a pure Markov strategy, given buyers’ strategies and beliefs. Notice that
for all t,i tm u s tb et h a tλt ≤ µt.
Proposition 8. Assume that the seller may grant secret discounts and buyers are naïve.
Let µ∗ denote the critical probability of Proposition 1, 2, and 3, respectively, and µ∗+ ≡
Pr(ω = G| µ∗,s= g).I f(i) α2 ≤ 1 − α or (ii) α2 > 1 − α and λ1 ∈ [¯ λα,1),t h es e l l e r
immediately posts and actually charges the low price pL (λ1) and triggers herding whenever
this is uniquely optimal in the observable prices case; otherwise she posts the high price
pH (µt) a n dg r a n t sas e c r e td i s c o u n tdt = pH (µt)−pL (µt) for the ﬁrst T periods t ∈ {1,...,T},
where T is a ﬁnite, deterministic integer. In the latter situation, µT+1 = µ∗ if pL(µ∗) is
uniquely optimal at µ∗ when prices are observable, and µT+1 = µ∗+ if pH(µ∗) is also optimal
at µ∗ when prices are observable. In period T + 1 the seller posts and charges pL (µ∗) or
pL (µ∗+), respectively, and triggers herding.
Proof: We ﬁrst consider the case where λ1 ∈ (0,µ ∗∗) ∪ (µ∗,1), where µ∗∗ is the critical
probability deﬁned in Proposition 3. In this case the low price pL (λ1) is uniquely optimal in
the observable prices case. Given the assumption on the buyers’ beliefs, the seller will post
and charge the low price pL (λ1), and thus herding is triggered immediately. The same is
true if λ1 = µ∗∗ or λ1 = µ∗ and the low price pL (λ1) is uniquely optimal in the observable
prices case.
Next we consider the case where λ1 ∈ (µ∗∗,µ ∗). Assume ﬁr s tt h a tf o rλt ∈ {µ∗∗,µ ∗} the
low price pL (λt) is uniquely optimal in the observable prices case. Since λ1 ∈ (µ∗∗,µ ∗), the
seller posts pH (λ1) as this would be the seller’s uniquely optimal price in the observable
prices case. Note that if µt ≥ µ∗ for some t ∈ {2,3,..}, then the seller will post and charge
the low price, and W (λt,µ t)=
pL(µt)
1−δ whenever µt ≥ µ∗ (since λt ≤ µt). For the following
inductive argument let µl = µ∗, and deﬁne µl−k ≡ Pr
¡
ω = G| µl,k signals s = b
¢
for any
positive integer k. Note that λ1 <µ ∗ implies µl−1 ≥ λ1. First we show that for any λt ≤ µl−1
it holds that at (λt,µ t)=
¡
λt,µ l−1¢

































The inequality holds because if λt ≤ µt and either α2 ≤ (1 − α) or α2 > (1 − α) and
µt ≥ ¯ λα, the immediate return from the low price exceeds that from the high price, i.e.,
















1−δ . Hence at (λt,µ t)=
¡
λt,µ l−1¢
it is optimal to post the high price and
















thus derive that the seller charges the low price at λ1. Hence the seller will post pH (µt) and
charge pL (µt), buyer t will purchase the object, and µt+1 = µ
+
t >µ t. This process continues
until at some ﬁnite T for the ﬁrst time µ∗ is reached. By assumption pL (µ∗) is uniquely
optimal in the observable prices case for λ = µ∗, hence the seller posts and charges pL (µ∗).
Finally, consider the case that for λt = µ∗∗ or for λt = µ∗ the high price pH (λt) is (also)
optimal in the observable prices case. The previous analysis shows that in these cases the
seller will post the high price and charge the low price at λ1 = µ∗∗ and λt = µ∗, respectively.
A.6. Proof of Proposition 9
Let µ∗ be the critical probability of Proposition 1. We spell out the proof of Proposition 9
under the assumption that at µ∗ only the low price pL (µ∗) is optimal when prices are observ-
able. However, if at µ∗ the high price pH (µ∗) is (also) optimal when prices are observable,
the argument is identical except that in the following µ∗ must be replaced by µ∗+.
Let µl be the maximal µ ∈ Λ(λ1) that is below ¯ λα, i.e., µl ≡ maxµ∈Λ(λ1)∩(0,¯ λα) µ. We
deﬁne µl+k ≡ Pr
¡
ω = G| µl,ksignals s = g
¢
and µl−k ≡ Pr
¡
ω = G| µl,ksignals s = b
¢
for
any positive integer k. Note that, given δ and λ1,t h e r ei saﬁnite positive integer, say Nδ ≥ 1,
such that µl+Nδ = µ∗. Proposition 8 implies that the seller will post pH ¡
µl+k¢
but give a
secret discount and actually charge only pL¡
µl+k¢
for all µl+k <µ ∗,k∈ {1,...,Nδ − 1}.
Moreover, αµl+1−h − pL ¡
µl+1−h¢
> 0 and αµl+1+h − pL ¡
µl+1+h¢
< 0 for all h ∈ {1,2,...},




τ = µl−k,k∈ {0,1,...}, and any δ ∈ [0,1), the seller can reach µ∗ in
k + Nδ periods, if she posts pH (µt) but actually charges only pL (µt) in each period t ∈
{τ,τ + 1,...,τ + k + Nδ − 1}. In period τ + k + Nδ the buyer updates µ
τ+k+Nδ = µ∗ from
the perceived history, and the seller posts and charges pL (µ∗) and triggers herding. In period


















Next we prove the following Lemma.
58Lemma 11: To each π ∈ (0,1) there exists a δπ ∈ (0,1) such that for all λ1 ∈ (0,1) the
































for all δ ∈ (δπ,1), where δπ decreases in π.































where the parameters µl, µ∗, and Nδ depend on λ1.D e ﬁne ¯ µl ≡ Pr
¡
ω = G| ¯ λα,s = b
¢
and






















for all h ∈ {1,2,...},µ l−h ≤ β
hµl < β
h¯ λα for all h ∈ {1,2,...} for all λ1 ∈ (0,1). Therefore,




















Because of Proposition 1, µ∗ → 1 and thus ¯ Nδ →∞for δ → 1. Since pL ¡
¯ µl+j¢
− α¯ λα ≥
pL ¡
¯ µl+2¢





− α¯ λα] →∞for δ → 1.





− α¯ λα] >











































holds for all λ1 ∈ (0,1).T h i sp r o v e st h a tf o ra l lλ1 ∈ (0,1) the inequality (6.16) is satisﬁed
for k =0provided δ ∈ (δπ,1) for some suﬃciently large δπ ∈ (0,1).M o r e o v e r ,δπ decreases
in π.
59Assume that inequality (6.16) holds for some k,g i v e ns o m eﬁxed δ ∈ (δπ,1). Given this



























































i.e., inequality (6.16) holds for k + 1 as well and the lemma follows.
Proposition 9. Assume that the seller may grant secret discounts and buyers are naïve.
Let µ∗ denote the critical probability of Proposition 1 and µ∗+ ≡ Pr(ω = G| µ∗,s= g).I f








the seller posts (and charges) the price pL (µ∗) in ﬁnite time with probability 1 if
pL(µ∗) is uniquely optimal at µ∗ when prices are observable, and posts (and charges) pL(µ∗+)
in ﬁnite time with probability 1 if pH(µ∗) is also optimal at µ∗ when prices are observable.
Thus, herding arises in ﬁnite time with probability 1, provided the seller is suﬃciently patient.
Proof: Consider an equilibrium where, given λ1 ∈ (0,1) and δ ∈ [0,1), the probability that
herding occurs in ﬁnite time is less than 1. In this case there must be a set of realizations
of signals (s1,s 2,...) that has positive probability, where herding will not occur and where
the seller’s updated probability that herding will not occur converges to 1. Therefore, given
any π ∈ (0,1) t h e r em u s tb ean o d e(λT,µ T) that is reached with positive probability
such that the seller’s updated probability that herding will not occur is larger than some


















































































































































































for all δ ∈ (δπ,1) because of Lemma 11. Since the last term on the right hand side is positive,
(6.17) cannot hold for δ ∈ (δπ,1). Because δπ decreases in π, the proposition follows with
¯ δ ≡ infπ∈(0,1) δπ.
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